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The Limits of Regulation by Insurance
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM* & DANIEL SCHWARCZ**
Insurance is an enormously powerful and beneficial method of spreading risk and
compensating for loss. But even insurance has its limits. A new and misleading
aspiration for insurance—that it also can and often does substitute for or
significantly complement health and safety regulation—is increasingly in vogue.
This vision starts from the uncontroversial recognition that insurers typically adopt
measures designed to counteract “moral hazard,” the tendency of insurance to blunt
policyholders’ incentives to take care. But proponents of this vision go on to contend
that the risk-reducing potential of insurance is significantly more extensive than is
traditionally imagined, because insurers are strategically positioned to induce their
policyholders to embrace precautions, procedures, policies, or training regimens
that decrease the incidence of loss. Proponents of this new “regulation thesis” often
dramatically summarize these points by describing insurance as a form of private
“regulation” or “loss prevention,” attempting to trade on the positive optics of these
notions. Enamored with this idea, commentators, activists, and lawmakers have
advanced various proposals to mandate the purchase of insurance or otherwise
intervene in insurance markets to address a broad range of modern social ills,
including police misconduct, gun violence, cyberattacks, and harms caused by
artificial intelligence. Building on emerging criticism of this regulation thesis as well
as increasing empirical evidence questioning its accuracy, this Article argues that
these regulatory aspirations for insurance are over-optimistic. Creating less loss
than insurance otherwise might have created is not regulation or loss prevention.
Rather, it is damage-control, and that is what insurance devices designed to combat
moral hazard almost always involve. Insurers face a daunting set of obstacles to
further reducing policyholder risk below what it would be in the absence of
insurance. In short, insurance has substantial limits as a solution for the failures of
regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
When all else fails, fall back on insurance. For many decades, that strategy has
addressed a number of important social problems, including postretirement income
insecurity,1 healthcare for the elderly,2 and compensation for auto accident injuries.3
Now, a new vision for insurance—what we will call the “regulation thesis”—is
increasingly in vogue. The regulation thesis is our term for the cluster of viewpoints,
proposals, and aspirations converging on the idea that insurance can and should serve
as a substitute for, or significant complement to, health and safety regulation.
Commentators of course vary in the extent to which they embrace this thesis: while
some outliers suggest that insurance can and should completely replace the
regulatory state,4 many offer a more moderated version of the thesis that emphasizes
the untapped or underappreciated regulatory potential of insurance.5

1. Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)—“social security”—
provides financial benefits to U.S. workers in “old” age. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a); see also
THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW & JOHN PAKUTKA, SOCIAL I NSURANCE: AMERICA’S
NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND CONTESTED FUTURE 187–93 (Olivia Weber-Stenis & Judy Selhorst
eds., 2014).
2. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 121–24; 42 U.S.C. § 1395c.
3. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION
708, 765–70 (7th ed. 2020).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MURPHY, CHAOS THEORY: TWO ESSAYS ON MARKET ANARCHY
(2002), https://cdn.mises.org/Chaos%20Theory_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW9Y-PTJ2].
5. See, e.g., Angela N. Aneiros, The Unlikely Pressure for Accountability: The
Insurance Industry’s Role in Social Change, TEX. J. CIV. LIBERTIES & CIV. RTS. (forthcoming
2022); Troy Herr, Cyber Insurance and Private Governance: The Enforcement Power of
Markets, 15 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 98 (2021); ANJA SHORTLAND, KIDNAP: INSIDE THE
RANSOM BUSINESS (2019); Deborah Ramirez, Marcus Wraight, Laurym Kilmister & Carly
Perkins, Policing the Police: Could Mandatory Professional Liability Insurance for Officers
Provide a New Accountability Model?, 45 AM. J. OF CRIM. L. 407 (2019); Anat Lior, Insuring
AI: The Role of Insurance in Artificial Intelligence Regulation, 35 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 467
(2022); Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law, 105 GEO. L.J.
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In recent years, however, various cracks have emerged in the foundations of the
regulation thesis. For instance, a number of influential scholars have developed
increasingly nuanced versions of the thesis, emphasizing that insurers often fail to
reduce risk in socially-beneficial ways for a variety of reasons.6 Some have gone
even further, arguing that insurers may attempt to increase risk so as to expand longterm demand for their products. 7 Meanwhile, various empirical studies have
demonstrated that insurers frequently do not live up to the lofty aspirations of the
regulation thesis, either doing little to induce their insureds to mitigate risk or
encouraging behavior that merely limits the prospect of their policyholders’ liability
without effectuating the deterrence goals underlying the imposition of liability
itself.8

55 (2016); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1539 (2017); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012); Peter Kochenburger, Liability
Insurance and Gun Violence, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1265 (2014); TIMOTHY D. LYTTON,
OUTBREAK: FOODBORNE ILLNESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FOOD SAFETY 147–52 (2019); Jan
Martin Lemnitzer, Why Cybersecurity Insurance Should be Regulated and Compulsory, 6 J.
CYBER POL’Y 118 (2021); see Andrew Verstein, Changing Guards: Improving Corporate
Governance with D&O Insurer Rotations, 108 VA. L. REV. 983 (2022).
6. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto
to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1412 (2013) (suggesting various
theoretical mechanisms by which insurers can shape the riskiness of their policyholders’
actions, while encouraging systematic empirical investigation of the extent to which these
theoretical possibilities are realized); Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance &
the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005)
(arguing that liability insurance can have a regulatory effect on gun risk, but that this risk is
contingent on the underlying liability regime); Shauhin A. Talesh, A New Institutional Theory
of Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 617 (2015) [hereinafter A New Institutional Theory of
Insurance]; Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance
Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Business, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 417 (2018)
[hereinafter Data Breach]; Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate
Regulators: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 479–84 (2017)
[hereinafter Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators]; Kyle D. Logue, Encouraging
Insurers to Regulate: The Role (If Any) for Tort Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1355, 1369–70
(2015) (emphasizing that insurers often fail to live up to their regulatory potential); Kyle D.
Logue & Adam B. Shniderman, The Case for Banning (and Mandating) Ransomware
Insurance, 28 CONN. INS. L.J. 247 (2021) (arguing that insurance could reduce the risk of
ransomware if states prohibited coverage for ransom payments, while permitting (or
mandating) coverage for the non-ransom related costs of ransomware attacks); Tom Baker &
Anja Shortland, Government and Insurance: Lessons for Ransomware, REGUL. &
GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2023) (exploring various ways in which government can facilitate
risk reduction in insurance markets). See generally infra Part I.A.
7. See Ronen Avraham & Ariel Porat, The Dark Side of Insurance,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4203765 [https://perma.cc/N9ZT7LD].
8. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007)
(demonstrating that D&O insurers often fail to take measures that can meaningfully limit the
risk of corporate malfeasance); Shauhin Talesh, Legal Intermediaries: How Insurance
Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with Antidiscrimination Laws, 37 LAW &

2022]

REG U LA TIO N BY IN SU R AN C E

219

This Article builds on this theory and evidence to argue that, although insurance
is a powerful and enormously beneficial method of spreading risk and compensating
for loss, it has significant limits as a regulatory device. These limits, moreover, are
often far more powerful than many of the more optimistic versions of the regulation
thesis contemplate. In advancing this argument, we not only highlight the mounting
evidence that insurers often fail to act as the regulation thesis imagines, but also
explain the forces behind this reality.9 By systematically cataloguing the flaws in the
regulation thesis, we show that, while there is some truth to the regulation thesis,
there is much less than is often suggested.
These conclusions should not be surprising, since the regulation thesis is in
tension with a primary purpose of insurance: to encourage productive and valuable
risk-taking by promising compensation for fortuitous losses that result from such
risk-taking.10 As a consequence, insurance has for centuries been understood to
dampen the incentives of insured parties to take care. This effect is known as “moral
hazard.”11 Dating back at least to the eighteenth century, legislatures and courts were
so concerned about moral hazard that they banned certain forms of insurance entirely
in the name of promoting public safety.12 Today, concern about moral hazard
remains at the heart of several foundational rules of insurance law, including
requirements that an insured party have an “insurable interest” in the subject matter
insured13 and prohibitions of insurance against liability for punitive damages.14
Completely unmanageable moral hazard is not, however, an inevitable byproduct
of insurance, or insurance as we know it would not exist.15 Insurers routinely adopt

POL’Y 209, 232–33 (2015) [hereinafter Legal Intermediaries] (finding that insurers’ risk
management efforts focus predominantly on coaching employers to avoid being sued rather
than on promoting the underlying goals of liability, such as fostering a healthy workplace
environment); Shauhin Talesh & Bryan Cunningham, The Technologization of Insurance: An
Empirical Analysis of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence’s Impact on Cybersecurity and
Privacy, 5 UTAH L. REV. 967, 975 (2021) (“Although reliance on technology and data are
increasingly transforming the way insurers advertise, underwrite, and price insurance, the
actual impact on insurer behavior seems to have remained minimal and is largely symbolic.”);
Marcos Antonio Mendoza, The Limits of Insurance as Governance: Professional Liability
Coverage for Civil Rights Claims Against Public School Districts, 38 Q UINNIPIAC L. REV. 375,
416–26 (2020). See generally infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Parts II & III.
10. See, e.g., HANNAH FARBER, UNDERWRITERS OF THE UNITED STATES: HOW INSURANCE
SHAPED THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 31–32 (2021) (showing how maritime insurance in the
eighteenth century supported commerce when governments failed to reduce risk on the high
seas).
11. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 8; Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
12. For example, courts deemed liability insurance to violate public policy until the
1880s, at which point they began to recognize that its risk-spreading benefits could outweigh
the costs of moral hazard. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND
TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 19–26 (2008).
13. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 229.
14. Id. at 102; see Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents,
64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005).
15. Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance, Risk and Resource Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE
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measures that counteract moral hazard well enough for insurance to function
effectively. A foundational literature in economics in the 1960s and ‘70s emphasized
this point by highlighting insurers’ use of risk-based pricing and partial insurance for
this purpose. Insurers employing risk-based pricing can reduce moral hazard by
setting premiums based on the risk an insured16 poses at the initial underwriting
stage, or by increasing premiums if an insured incurred a preventable loss in prior
coverage periods.17 Similarly, insurers can increase an insured party’s incentives to
avoid loss by including loss-sharing provisions in their policies like deductibles, coinsurance, and monetary limits on coverage.18
The overall tone of these early studies was that insurers can mitigate, but not
eliminate, the tendency of their products to induce moral hazard by creating
countervailing incentives for insureds to take care. In subsequent decades, however,
an influential strain of legal and sociological scholarship generated ideas that
developed into the regulation thesis, suggesting that economists failed to fully
appreciate just how well insurance can, and often does, counteract moral hazard.19
According to this work, there is a broad array of tools beyond risk-based pricing and
loss-sharing provisions that insurers can use to mitigate moral hazard, many of which
can affirmatively assist insureds in reducing risk and preventing the occurrence of
loss.
Much of this socio-legal scholarship on the regulatory potential of insurance
implicitly acknowledged that due to moral hazard, insurance typically has what we
call a net-negative effect on loss prevention. In other words, in the aggregate there
are more losses when there is insurance than there would be in the absence of
insurance. But more modern strains of the regulation thesis often go further,
implicitly or even explicitly suggesting that insurance can, and often does, have a
net-positive effect on loss prevention by reducing losses below the levels that would
occur in the absence of insurance against the losses in question.20

THEORY OF RISK BEARING 134, 137–42 (Julius Margolis ed., 1971); Baker, supra note 11, at
237.
16. We will use the terms “policyholder” and “insured” interchangeably, although
technically the policyholder is the party who purchases an insurance policy (and is also
ordinarily an insured party), whereas an “insured” is simply a party covered by the policy,
whether or not a purchaser.
17. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986).
18. Id.; Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541, 541–42
(1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 80 (1979).
19. See CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL
HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985); François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 197 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991);
RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE AND THE
LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (2004); Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of
Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND
RESPONSIBILITY 33 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
20. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 199 (“This Article develops the
opposite proposition—that insurance can reduce and in some cases solve, rather than create or
exacerbate, the moral hazard and related incentive problems.”); Lemann, supra note 5, at 55
(“Insurance can now, in many cases, deter risky conduct more effectively than tort law.”);
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This would be an attractive story if it were accurate, but it is inaccurate in two
respects. First, it risks being misleading by using terminology in a figurative way and
thereby exaggerating what insurance accomplishes. Creating less danger than
insurance might otherwise have created, by employing risk-based pricing or losssharing, for example, is not “regulation” or “loss prevention” in the sense that these
terms are likely to be understood by the targeted audience. Unlike government
regulation or even regulation by private parties who are delegated governmental
authority, insurers principally “govern” the behavior of their insureds through
contract terms and pricing strategies that attempt to counteract the problems that their
more fundamental risk-protection products create. This is hardly “loss prevention”
or “regulation.” Rather, it is damage control, and that is what insurance devices
designed to combat moral hazard generally involve.21
The second, and more fundamental, inaccuracy in the story involves the dream
that insurance can go beyond merely mitigating moral hazard to have a net-positive
effect on loss prevention. Enamored with this possibility, and perhaps even misled
by their own figurative language, commentators, activists, and policymakers have
advanced various proposals to mandate the purchase of insurance or otherwise
intervene in insurance markets to address a broad range of modern social ills. These
include police misconduct,22 gun violence,23 cyberattacks,24 food safety,25 corporate
diversity initiatives,26 and harms caused by artificial intelligence.27
In fact, however, insurers’ ability to completely overcome moral hazard through
incentive structures and the provision of affirmative guidance and services is more

Aneiros, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that “D&O insurers hav[e] the power to hold boards
accountable, thereby placing insurance companies in a unique position to advance social
justice”); Lior, supra note 5, at 467 (“Insurance has the power to better handle AI-inflicted
damages, serving both a preventive and compensatory function.”); Lemnitzer, supra note 5,
at 131 (arguing that if “every SME in the EU was insured, the Digital Single Market would be
a much safer environment for all companies and their customers . . . where hacks are rarer,
losses to cybercrime are lower and customer and client data is safer than anywhere else in the
world.”).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See, e.g., Ramirez et al., supra note 5; Suzanne Barlyn & Alwyn Scott, Insurers
Exploring ‘New World’ of Police Officer Professional Liability, INSURANCE J. (July 24, 2020)
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/07/24/576789.htm [https://perma.cc/
3ZUQ-QHFN] (because officers would pay any premium increases arising from their
misconduct, premium increases “would force an officer to either change their behavior or
leave the field of law enforcement”).
23. Kochenburger, supra note 5, at 1265; Baker & Farrish, supra note 6, at 292.
24. See Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, Cybersecurity Insurance Industry
Readout
Reports,
https://www.cisa.gov/publication/cybersecurity-insurance-reports
[https://perma.cc/F4EB-5JEA] (“A robust cybersecurity insurance market could help reduce
the number of successful cyber attacks by: (1) promoting the adoption of preventative
measures in return for more coverage; and (2) encouraging the implementation of best
practices by basing premiums on an insured’s level of self-protection.”). See also Logue &
Shniderman, supra note 6.
25. See Lytton, supra note 5.
26. See Aneiros, supra note 5.
27. See Lior, supra note 5.
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theoretical than real.28 And in most cases, there is little or no reason to think that
experience would be any different under proposals to use insurance as a solution to
the above problems. This is because insurers in most markets face a dizzying array
of economic impediments to effectively reducing risk, including collective action
problems, information asymmetries, competing long-term and short-term incentives,
and limitations in their ability to manage the impact of insurance on third parties.29
None of this is to suggest that insurance can never have a net-positive effect on
loss. Perhaps most notably, there is a long-term possibility that a brave new world of
telematics, in which insurers will be able to monitor the conduct of their
policyholders in real time and charge them for coverage accordingly, will multiply
the regulatory potential of insurance.30 But this is not our world, and it is not the
world of the near future. 31 More importantly, the potential power of telematics in
auto insurance does not translate easily to most other insurance settings because
driving risk can in theory be almost perfectly observed by technology at zero
marginal cost, the causal determinants of auto accident risk are well understood,
insureds have strong non-pecuniary reasons to avoid losses, and auto liability
insurance is legally mandated in most states. These factors are weaker or completely
missing in many other insurance settings.32
We develop these arguments beginning in Part I, with a review and analysis of
the theoretical and empirical literature on insurance, moral hazard, and loss
prevention. This review not only analyzes the contending theories, but also uncovers
the fact that the most convincing evidence of substantial insurer involvement in loss
prevention programs involves some atypical, niche insurance markets populated by
what we call “genuine” mutual insurers, or by a small number of commercial insurers
operating in a narrow specialty, such as Lloyds’ maritime insurance for arctic
shipping. In sharp contrast, studies focused on insurance in more typical commercial
markets suggest that insurers generally rely on conventional and relatively passive
measures to counteract moral hazard that cannot plausibly wholly reverse the netnegative effect of insurance on loss prevention. Whether the glass is half-empty or
half-full, the important point is that, for the reasons we will identify, it would be
difficult to pour more water into the glass. As we indicate at many points below,
there is a considerable amount of effective mitigation of losses by insurance—just
not as much as some authors think there is, or imagine there could be.
In order to show why, Part II focuses on the conventional techniques that insurers
can and do use to help mitigate moral hazard, and on the substantial limitations of
these techniques. We define conventional techniques as those that can be

28. See infra Part I.
29. See infra Parts II & III.
30. See Yizhou Jin & Shoshana Vasserman, Buying Data from Consumers: The Impact
of
Monitoring
Programs
in
U.S.
Auto
Insurance
(2021),
https://shoshanavasserman.com/files/2022/JV.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYD4-Z6JW].
31. See Mitchell Scrimgeour-Brown, Telematics “a Total Game Changer” for Auto
Insurers,
INSURANCE
BUS.
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/commercial-auto/telematics-a-total-gamechanger-for-auto-insurers-259488.aspx [https://perma.cc/S4PN-D7E8] (noting that only six
percent of consumers in the United States are enrolled in telematics programs).
32. See infra Part II.
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operationalized through traditional processes that insurers must typically maintain as
an ordinary incident of transferring and spreading policyholder risk. 33 For the most
part, these techniques create incentives for policyholders to engage in loss prevention
or loss reduction on their own. Examples include not only risk-based pricing and
loss-sharing through partial insurance, but also the use of coverage exclusions and
ex post loss management. In each instance, we show that insurers’ practical capacity
to effectively deploy these tools in ways that combat moral hazard is often quite
limited. And rarely, if ever, can these tools go beyond combatting moral hazard by
having a net-positive effect on loss prevention.
Part III then analyzes unconventional techniques that insurers can employ to
combat moral hazard and promote loss prevention. We define risk-mitigation tools
as unconventional if they operate outside the confines of traditional insurance
functions that are necessary to transfer risk from policyholders to insurers. These
techniques tend not to rely on incentive creation for policyholders in the manner of
conventional techniques. Rather, they often consist of the direct provision of loss
prevention services to policyholders. Examples include direct insurer efforts to coach
safer conduct, advise policyholders on loss-mitigation strategies, provide ongoing
risk-detection services, and influence public policy regarding loss prevention and
cost spreading. Although much recent literature has touted the potential for these
methods both to counteract moral hazard and reduce risk more generally, we show
that their frequency of use and effectiveness is limited, because they are often not
profit-maximizing for commercial insurers to embrace. And just like their
conventional counterparts, these unconventional techniques usually do not result in
insurance having a net-positive impact on risk. Only highly exceptional, niche
insurers stand out as an exception to this proposition.
Finally, Part IV identifies the lessons of our analysis. We do not oppose insurer
involvement in loss prevention when it is effective. But that is much less common
than many entries in the regulation-thesis literature suggest. To support our position,
we first elucidate the differences among avoiding moral hazard, combatting moral
hazard, loss prevention, and regulation. Focusing on these distinct categories, we
then explain how our analysis supports the conclusion that insurance will rarely have
a net-positive impact on loss prevention.
I. INSURANCE, MORAL HAZARD, AND LOSS PREVENTION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The literature on insurance, moral hazard, and loss prevention naturally divides
itself into theory on the one hand, and evidence on the other. For the most part, the
theory came first and was largely the province of economists and socio-legal
scholars. Section A reviews this theoretical work. Section B surveys the empirical
evidence examining how insurance manages moral hazard and promotes loss
prevention, much of which has been produced by legal scholars and sociologists.

33. There are, of course, other ways of sub-dividing insurers’ loss prevention strategies.
For instance, conventional loss prevention by insurers is typically passive, whereas
unconventional loss prevention is often active. But because these trends are not universal, an
alternative approach is to subdivide loss prevention strategies based on the extent to which
they require active engagement by insurers.
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A. Theory
Because economists came first to the subject, their early work developed simple,
general models of insurance in the face of moral hazard. Subsequent legal and
sociological theory-building elaborated and refined earlier work based in part on
anecdotal observations of how insurance operates in practice.
1. The Economic Literature on Moral Hazard and Loss Prevention
The second half of the twentieth century was a fruitful period for scholarship
regarding the economics of information, and a significant branch of this theory
focused on insurance and moral hazard.34 Moral hazard can be understood to be a
byproduct of incomplete information because it could be completely eliminated by
an insurer that was able to costlessly and perfectly monitor an insured party’s
conduct. Knowing the risks that the insured took during the policy period, the insurer
could adjust premiums at the end of the policy period on that basis. Anticipating
having to pay a premium calculated in this manner, the insured would invest in loss
prevention so as to minimize the sum of loss-prevention costs and risk-adjusted
premiums, thereby eliminating moral hazard.35
In the absence of complete information,36 however, insurance threatens to create
moral hazard, because the insured incurs the full cost of loss prevention, but only
some of the benefits. The extent to which moral hazard in fact occurs depends on
various factors, including the extent to which policyholders have control over lossproducing behavior and whether monetary insurance payouts can fully compensate
for a loss.37 It is also sometimes worthwhile to distinguish (as we do at various points
in Parts II and III) between moral hazard manifested in conscious decisions to take
risk because of the availability of insurance to cover resulting losses, and moral
hazard generated when the insured does not know whether its conduct is riskincreasing, but is less concerned than it otherwise would be of this prospect, precisely
because it has insurance.
Any moral hazard that insurance does generate, the mid-twentieth century
insurance economists emphasized, could be partly counteracted by risk-based pricing
and partial insurance. Premiums reflecting the insurer’s ex ante estimate of
policyholders’ risk levels, based on each policyholder’s observable characteristics or
loss experience, could counteract moral hazard by allowing policyholders who take
care to pay lower insurance premiums.38 In addition, partial insurance, in the form of
deductibles, coinsurance, and monetary coverage limits, could give policyholders

34. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to
Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1441, 1454–55 (2000).
35. See supra note 14.
36. See infra Part II (noting that the advent of telematics could solve some but far from
all aspects of the problem of incomplete information, but its capacity to do that is not likely to
be realized in the near future).
37. See Baker, supra note 11, at 267–81.
38. See ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 67–68.
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direct financial incentives to limit risk, while preserving insurance protection against
substantial losses.39
In the early phases of moral hazard and loss prevention theory, these devices for
combatting moral hazard were understood to create incentives for the insured to
engage in loss prevention without directly mandating this investment or dictating
how it should proceed. Instead, the policyholder would compare the cost of engaging
in additional loss prevention with the decreased costs of insurance that could be
expected to result from doing so and determine the optimal balance to strike.40
In this simple model of the relation among insurance, moral hazard, and loss
prevention, the insurer and insured did not interact outside of the processes of
insurance purchase and claims management. Moreover, the assumed sequence of
events at the time of insurance purchase was relatively straightforward: the
policyholder applied for coverage by disclosing requested information to the insurer,
after which point the insurer offered a policy at a specific price or else declined to
provide any coverage at all. In this model, the insurer did not provide the insured
with information about how insurance premiums would vary in the future depending
on loss experience or the different forms of loss prevention the insured adopted. In
practice, however, interactions between policyholders and insurers are rarely this
simple.
2. Legal and Sociological Theory on Moral Hazard and Loss Prevention
It was only in later phases of academic research into moral hazard and loss
prevention—much of which has been produced by legal academics and
sociologists—that more explicit attention has been paid to the manner in which
insurers and insureds interact before, during, and after the purchase of coverage.41
For example, prior to the purchase of coverage, insurers may attempt to attract
business by proving themselves capable of affirmatively assisting their insureds with
loss prevention. The closer to an optimal reduction of losses an insurer can assist its
insureds in accomplishing, the lower the premiums that insureds can expect to be
charged.42 Once an individual or entity purchases an insurance policy, the parties’
incentives may change, though the end result does not: insurers can profit by
promoting loss prevention among existing insureds to reduce their claim payouts.43
A significant contribution of this research consists of identifying different forms
of potential insurer involvement in loss prevention. Many of these involve
particularized use of conventional techniques for limiting moral hazard, such as risk-

39. See supra Part I.A.
40. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and SelfProtection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623, 633–34 (1972).
41. Carol Heimer has suggested that these interactions resemble a continuing “game”
between insurer and policyholder rather than a single transaction. HEIMER, supra note 19, at
3.
42. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 207–08; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 199 (1987) (“When parties can influence risks, insurers often
supply advice about risk reduction and include in policies a great variety of features that serve
to induce insured parties to lower risk.”).
43. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 207–08.
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based pricing. Insurers, for instance, can base premiums on policyholder
characteristics, such as the type of car insured or the building materials out of which
an insured property is constructed. Such “feature rating”44 may even involve explicit
premium discounts for specific policyholder precautions. Another form of risk-based
pricing, known as “experience rating,” involves explicit or implicit promises of
reduced premiums for future policies if insureds avoid losses in the present period. 45
Recent contributions have emphasized that insurers can also mitigate risk through
contract terms that limit or condition coverage for losses or practices associated with
moral hazard.46 Claims-handling processes offer insurers yet another opportunity to
mitigate loss, both by preventing small losses from growing larger and by ensuring
that efforts to remediate and/or address losses operate efficiently.
In addition to these conventional loss prevention techniques, this new wave of
research emphasizes that insurers also can take proactive steps to reduce policyholder
risk, which operate independently of ordinary insurance mechanisms that are
necessary to effectuate the transfer of risk. Such “unconventional” loss prevention
techniques can include insurer-provided services that “coach” safer conduct through
customized training sessions with policyholder personnel, insurer support for the
development and adoption of policyholder rules and procedures, and insurer advice
on specific safety questions.47 Insurers’ unconventional loss prevention strategies
can also extend beyond their interactions with policyholders; insurers may promote
risk-reducing technologies, knowledge, or public policies.48
Ben-Shahar and Logue’s recent work has been particularly influential in
emphasizing the broad array of loss prevention devices available to insurers. 49
Drawing from various sources—including academic articles, insurance marketing
materials, and regulatory materials—Ben-Shahar and Logue highlight the power of
various conventional loss prevention techniques, such as experience rating in
workers’ compensation insurance,50 feature rating and extensive underwriting in
environmental liability insurance,51 and claims management by auto insurers.52 They
also provide examples of insurers using unconventional techniques to help prevent
loss, such as claims by a products liability insurer that it advises policyholders
regarding prevention of malicious tampering, appropriately labeling products, and

44. ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 71–72.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 215. Homeowners’ insurers, for
instance, exclude coverage for the freezing of plumbing, heating, and air conditioning systems
unless the insured used reasonable care to maintain heat in the building or shut off the water
supply. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 211.
47. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1573–86.
48. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 6.
49. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 202–15. Various other articles have also
highlighted the array of loss prevention devices that insurers can use. See Baker & Swedloff,
supra note 6, at 1418–23; George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss
Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 324–27
(1997); Daniel W. Woods & Tyler Moore, Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing
Cybersecurity?, IEEE SEC. & PRIV. MAG., Jan./Feb. 2020, at 21, 22–23.
50. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 219–20.
51. See id. at 225–26.
52. Id. at 213–14.
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issuing recalls.53 Logue also observes that many large insurers have a division
devoted to educating insureds on risk reduction.54 Additionally, Ben-Shahar and
Logue emphasize auto insurers’ role in developing and promoting auto safety
information through the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, a nonprofit entity
that insurers founded and continue to fund.55
However, not all recent studies are sanguine about insurers’ capacity to reduce
moral hazard. Baker and Shortland have suggested that, in many cases, insurers can
only combat moral hazard in tandem with government regulation that facilitates this
process by, for instance, setting minimum safety or insurance standards.56 Prior work
by Baker and several different coauthors emphasizes both the potential of the
regulation thesis as well as various impediments to insurers effectively counteracting
risk, ranging from agency problems within corporate policyholders, to limited
insurer market power, to disconnects between liability-reducing measures and risk
reduction.57 Similarly, work by Talesh has suggested various potential limits to the
regulation thesis, including the prospect that insurers may attempt to alter
policyholder behavior in ways that do less to reduce the risk of socially undesirable
results than to reduce liability for those results. 58 Logue has also explored why
affirmative insurer involvement in loss prevention is “surprisingly uncommon,”
highlighting the prospect that such involvement may expose insurers to liability. 59
Even less optimistically, Avraham and Porat have contended that insurers often
attempt to promote, or at least quietly favor, increases in long-term aggregate losses
so as to preserve or expand long-term demand for their products.60 Insurers then
compete individually either to reduce their own insureds’ losses or to shift them onto
third parties that they do not insure. To substantiate these claims, they cite various
examples of insurers encouraging insureds to shift losses to other parties rather than
reduce risk, such as education programs designed to prevent employers from being

53. Id. at 219.
54. Logue, supra note 6, at 1364 (“Most large property/casualty insurance companies
have a division whose primary job is to educate insureds about how to reduce risks.”).
55. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 222.
56. See Baker & Shortland, supra note 6, 3–8.
57. See Baker & Shortland, supra note 6; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 6; BAKER &
FARRISH, supra note 6;
58. See Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 8, at 232–33; Talesh, A New Institutional
Theory of Insurance, supra note 6, at 650 (suggesting that insurers may “foster forms of
compliance that tend to be more symbolic than substantive and thus unable to adequately
protect insureds, consumers, and the public at large”). This possibility that insurers may induce
perfunctory compliance that fails to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law is a theme
in the broader compliance literature. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, W ORKING LAW: COURTS,
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2016).
59. Logue, supra note 6, at 1357–58.
60. Avraham & Porat, supra note 7. This idea has been previously suggested by others.
See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 357 (1990) (noting that insurers might not have incentives to offer loss
prevention services because doing so could force them to charge lower premiums in the
future); Harris Schlesinger & Emilio C. Venezian, Ex Ante Loss Control by Insurers: Public
Interest for Higher Profit, 4 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 83, 83 (1990).
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held liable for discriminatory behavior by their employees. 61 In addition, Avraham
and Porat interpret insurers’ support for certain tort reforms and apology policies as
designed to promote increased losses.62
Even when insurers can combat moral hazard associated with policyholders’
conduct, insurers may be less able to prevent insurance from encouraging
wrongdoing by third parties that are not bound by the insurance policy. As
Parchomovsky and Siegelman have argued, such “third-party moral hazard” can
occur when parties outside the insurance relationship cause a potentially covered loss
so as to benefit from the insurance payout.63 This form of moral hazard materializes,
for instance, when kidnappers target corporate executives that are likely to be
protected by kidnapping insurance, or when hackers launch ransomware on entities
likely to have cyber insurance.64 The third parties who are influenced by the presence
of insurance may not be responsive to ordinary methods of combatting moral hazard,
which typically rely on the contractual relationship between insurer and insured. 65
B. Evidence
Those who study insurers’ involvement in loss prevention do not merely
propound theory. Rather, theory is often allied with efforts to demonstrate insurers’
actual involvement in loss prevention. Only a few of these studies find substantial
insurer involvement in combatting moral hazard in ways that extend beyond riskbased pricing and loss-sharing provisions, and these studies disproportionately focus
on insurance markets where nontraditional insurers predominate. In contrast, a
number of scholars have found that insurers either are not heavily involved in
affirmatively helping insureds to prevent loss or that their involvement is ineffective
in limiting the risk of loss.
1. Economic Studies
Not surprisingly, a significant economics literature has attempted to identify and
measure moral hazard in different insurance markets. This task is substantially
complicated by potential correlations between risk preferences and precautions 66 as

61. See Avraham & Porat, supra note 7; see also Legal Intermediaries, supra note 8.
62. Avraham & Porat, supra note 7.
63. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Third-Party Moral Hazard and the
Problem of Insurance Externalities, 51 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 93 (2022).
64. Cf. SHORTLAND, supra note 5 (describing ways in which kidnap and ransom insurers
attempt to limit the third-party moral hazard by, for instance, making the availability of such
coverage difficult to detect and by drawing out ransom negotiations to limit the attractiveness
of this strategy to kidnappers).
65. See generally Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 63.
66. See David de Meza & David C. Webb, Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets,
32 RAND J. ECON. 249 (2001) (describing possibility that there is correlation between risk
preferences and risk-avoiding activities, which can create advantageous selection); Daniel
Osberghaus, The Effect of Flood Experience on Household Mitigation—Evidence From
Longitudinal and Insurance Data, 43 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 126, 126 (2017) (showing those
who have flood insurance are also more likely to attempt to mitigate flood risk); Daniel R.
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well as the difficulty of disentangling adverse selection and moral hazard effects.67
Attempts to overcome these difficulties suggest that while moral hazard is often
significant, its magnitude varies across different types of insurance markets and
institutional settings.68 Perhaps for this reason, few of these empirical studies
examine the prevalence or effectiveness of specific insurer loss prevention strategies.
Economic studies that do focus on specific insurer loss prevention strategies
suggest that certain techniques for mitigating moral hazard can be effective.69 The
most significant such recent study found that auto insurers’ use of telematics can
substantially decrease auto accidents.70 Telematic programs provide policyholders
with plug-in devices that employ GPS and on-board diagnostics to monitor such
driving behavior as braking, speed, and time of day. Policyholders then receive
discounts for safe driving.71 Depending on how the telematics program is structured,
it can more closely resemble feature rating, experience rating, or a combination of
the two. A recent study of telematic programs finds that they can cause drivers to
become thirty percent safer than conventionally-insured drivers, at least while
drivers in the former category are being actively monitored.72 The study also found,
however, that many consumers experience significant privacy-related costs from
telematic monitoring, which have to date substantially impeded broad adoption of
these technologies.73
Various additional economic studies have also documented the capacity of
conventional insurer techniques to limit moral hazard. For instance, one study
showed a reduction in risk when Taiwanese insurers introduced a deductible that
increased during a policy year in the event of a car accident. 74 A number of other

Petrolia, Joonghyun Hwang, Craig E. Landry & Keith H. Coble, Wind Insurance and
Mitigation in the Coastal Zone, 91 LAND ECON. 272, 272 (2015) (finding that those who buy
wind insurance also invest more in wind risk mitigation).
67. See, e.g., Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, Testing for Asymmetric
Information in Insurance Markets, 108 J. POL. ECON. 56 (2000) (exploring empirical
techniques for disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection).
68. Compare Jaap H. Abbring, Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, Moral Hazard
and Dynamic Insurance Data, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 767 (2003) (finding limited evidence of
moral hazard in French auto insurance markets), with Shiyi Chen, Xiaoxiao Ding, Pingyi Lou
& Hong Song, New Evidence of Moral Hazard: Environmental Liability Insurance and Firms’
Environmental Performance, 89 J. RISK & INS. 581 (2022) (finding that firms’ purchase of
environmental liability insurance in China significantly reduces their efforts in treating water
pollution), and Jennifer L.Wang, Ching-Fan Chung & Larry Y. Tzeng, An Empirical Analysis
of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard, 75 J. RISK & INS. 551 (2008)
(finding significant evidence of moral hazard in Taiwan auto insurance market).
69. See, e.g., Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based Pricing
and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental
Accidents, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326–27 (2011).
70. See Jin & Vasserman, supra note 30, at 19.
71. See,
e.g.,
Get
Snapshot
from
Progressive,
PROGRESSIVE,
https://www.progressive.com/auto/discounts/snapshot/ [https://perma.cc/G7M7-XYTH].
72. Jin & Vasserman, supra note 30, at 2.
73. See id. at 3–4.
74. Wang, Chung & Tzeng, supra note 68 (finding that individuals who saw their
deductible increase in a policy year due to an accident filed fewer claims during the remainder
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studies also demonstrate that risk-based pricing can reduce losses, particularly in
workers’ compensation insurance, where experience rating appears to significantly
promote safety.75 There is also some evidence that traditional risk-based pricing in
auto insurance markets can induce safer driving.76 To similar effect are some survey
studies that suggest that respondents would be willing to take precautions in
exchange for premium discounts.77 A much older, but quite prominent, study
employed a large-scale, randomized experiment in loss-sharing provisions for health
insurance, finding that increased loss sharing significantly decreased health care
consumption.78
2. Empirical Studies in Law and Sociology
In addition to economic studies, an increasing number of qualitative studies have
extensively investigated insurers’ loss prevention efforts. These studies typically rely
principally on interviews with industry professionals operating in insurance markets
like municipal liability, legal malpractice, and cyber insurance. 79 Frequently, these
interviews are supplemented with various other sources, such as insurer marketing
materials, conference materials, and insurance policies.
These studies reach decidedly mixed conclusions about the pervasiveness and
effectiveness of insurers’ loss prevention efforts, particularly with respect to
unconventional strategies. To be sure, a number of these studies document extensive
insurer involvement in loss prevention. For instance, John Rappaport found that
some police liability insurers for municipalities and counties influenced
departmental policy, provided education and training, performed audits of police
departments, considered accreditation in pricing, identified problematic personnel,
and encouraged structural reform.80 Rappaport emphasized, however, that

of the policy year).
75. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 219–20; Michael M. Barth, Robert W.
Klein & Gregory Krohm, Workers’ Compensation Insurance Experience Rating and
Subsequent Employer Claims: The Wisconsin Experience, 31 J. INS. ISSUES 16, 16 (2008);
John W. Ruser, Workers’ Compensation Insurance, Experience-Rating, and Occupational
Injuries, 16 RAND J. ECON. 487, 488 (1985); see also Logue, supra note 6, at 1369
(“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that workers’ compensation insurers are among the most
active direct regulators of their insureds’ risky activities.”).
76. See, e.g., Richard A. Derrig & Sharon Tennyson, The Impact of Rate Regulation on
Claims: Evidence from Massachusetts Automobile Insurance, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV.
173, 197 (2011).
77. See, e.g., W.J.W. Botzen, J.C.J.H. Aerts & J.C.J.M. van den Bergh, Willingness of
Homeowners to Mitigate Climate Risk Through Insurance, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2265
(2009) (reporting survey data showing that homeowners are willing to undertake measures to
mitigate flood risk in exchange for premium discounts on flood insurance policies); Jantsje
M. Mol, W.J. Wouter Botzen & Julia E. Blasch, Behavioral Motivations for Self-Insurance
Under Different Disaster Risk Insurance Schemes, 180 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 967 (2020)
(presenting similar findings).
78. Aviva Aron-Dine, Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, The RAND Health Insurance
Experiment, Three Decades Later, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 197, 220 (2013).
79. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 6, at 1450; Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1540.
80. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1564–86.
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intergovernmental insurance pools—cooperative groups of governmental entities
that join together to pool risk—seemed to be more actively involved in these loss
prevention activities than commercial insurers.81 Similarly, Tom Baker and Rick
Swedloff found that legal malpractice mutual insurers provided expert “support and
assistance” to “varying degrees,” which law firm policyholders reported valuing
highly. 82 To similar effect is recent work by Tom Baker and Anja Shortland, which
found that kidnapping insurers and maritime insurers of arctic shipping engaged in
significant cooperation to implement risk-reducing safety standards.83 In both cases,
though, the number of insurers providing coverage was limited, and they operated
out of Lloyds and a few other niche markets, thus facilitating cooperation through
tight-knit organizations like the International Union of Maritime Insurers.84
But other studies using qualitative techniques have found much more limited
insurer involvement in loss prevention generally, and in unconventional loss
prevention in particular. Most notably, in a series of articles and a subsequent book,
Tom Baker and Sean Griffith found that Directors and Officers (D&O) insurers
engage in little loss prevention and minimal monitoring of corporate governance by
their insureds.85 Additionally, Baker and Griffith found that D&O insurers do not
offer premium discounts for specific loss prevention efforts. 86 Marcos Mendoza
similarly found that the liability insurers of public schools do little to influence the
civil rights policies of their insured school districts or to otherwise engage in
“assertive loss prevention requirements” to limit the risk of civil rights violations and
resulting liability claims.87 Like Baker and Griffith, he also found that there were
few premium discounts offered for risk-reducing measures by liability insurers of
public schools and no premium penalties imposed on insureds who refused to take
risk-mitigating measures.88
Research on cyber insurance has also found uneven and limited evidence of
insurers’ involvement in unconventional forms of loss prevention. Shauhin Talesh,
for instance, concluded in earlier work that cyber insurers frequently provide
“scanning” and “cyber health checks” aimed at preventing and detecting data
breaches,89 as well as providing written training materials and hotlines. 90 He also
found that cyber insurers were highly involved in managing policyholders’ incident-

81. Id. at 1564.
82. Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law
Firms, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 39–40 (2017).
83. See Baker & Shortland, supra note 6.
84. See Baker & Shortland, supra note 6, at 7, 13.
85. Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 1799.
86. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 112 (2010). As one insurance
executive explained, “we couldn’t show the discount” for following loss prevention advice.
Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 1811. It seems highly likely that interviews with industry
professionals would have uncovered evidence of premium savings that could be obtained from
following insurers’ loss prevention advice, if such savings were actually available.
87. Mendoza, supra note 8, at 389.
88. Id. at 422–24.
89. Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 6, at 429; Talesh, Insurance Companies as
Corporate Regulators, supra note 6, at 478.
90. Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 6, at 430–32.
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response efforts in the wake of an attack so as to ensure future regulatory compliance
and limit the risk of lawsuits. But Talesh, along with Bryan Cunningham,
subsequently found much more limited evidence that cyber insurers can actually
limit firms’ risk of experiencing a cyberattack or the losses that stem from such an
incident.91 In particular, Talesh and Cunningham found that cyber insurers’ use of
big data to prevent loss did not improve overall cybersecurity and was sometimes
used instead to nudge clients toward purchasing more insurance.92 Insurers’ role as
“quasi-regulators,” they concluded, was “largely ineffective,”93 an assessment that
many experts in the cyber insurance field share. 94 In another study, these same
authors concluded that “[a]lthough reliance on technology and data are increasingly
transforming the way insurers advertise, underwrite, and price insurance, the actual
impact on insurer behavior seems to have remained minimal and is largely
symbolic.”95
Other studies have also offered pessimistic assessments of cyber insurers’ loss
prevention strategies. For instance, MacColl, Nurse, and Sullivan recently concluded
that cyber insurers’ “contribution to improving cyber security practices is more
limited than policymakers and businesses might hope,” in part because insurers
rarely use financial incentives to encourage better cybersecurity. 96 And while the
evidence does indeed suggest that cyber insurers provide policyholders with various
post-incident services,97 these services are typically outsourced to third-party firms,

91. See Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 8, at 976. In other work, Talesh has also found
mixed evidence of effective governance among employment practices liability insurers. See
Legal Intermediaries, supra note 8, at 218; Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators,
supra note 6, at 499 (“Thus, similar to the D&O context, [EPLI] risk management services
may merely encourage employers to reduce their exposure and liability rather than prevent
discrimination, improve work culture, and cultivate a discrimination-free work
environment.”).
92. See Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 8, at 976.
93. Id. at 59.
94. JOSEPHINE WOLFF, CYBERINSURANCE POLICY: RETHINKING RISK IN AN AGE OF
RANSOMWARE, COMPUTER FRAUD, DATA BREACHES, AND CYBERATTACKS (2022) (suggesting
that cyber insurers have played a limited role in helping to reduce the risk of cyber incidents).
95. Talesh & Cunningham, supra note 8, at 975.
96. Jamie MacColl, Jason R. C. Nurse & James Sullivan, Cyber Insurance and the Cyber
Security
Challenge,
RUSI
(June
28,
2021),
https://rusi.org/explore-ourresearch/publications/occasional-papers/cyber-insurance-and-cyber-security-challenge
[https://perma.cc/X8DH-WNYZ].
97. See Daniel W. Woods & Rainer Böhme, How Cyber Insurance Shapes Incident
Response:
A
Mixed
Methods
Study,
(June
7,
2021),
https://informationsecurity.uibk.ac.at/pdfs/DW2021_HowInsuranceShapes_WEIS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LH4-XQCQ]. These authors found that cyber insurers typically outsource
cyber-responses to computer forensic teams, legal experts, and public relations firms, all of
which have preexisting arrangements with the insurer. For discussion of how this incident
response process may impede long-term cybersecurity, see Daniel Schwarcz, Josephine Wolff
& Daniel W. Woods, How Privilege Undermines Cybersecurity, 36 HARV. J. LAW & TECH
(forthcoming 2023).
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at least some of whom the insurer selects because they are willing to accept limited
compensation rather than because they offer the best incident response options.98
Empirical work examining Employer Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) has
also critically assessed insurers’ loss prevention efforts. In particular, Talesh found
that while EPLI insurers do attempt to coach policyholders in certain riskmanagement practices, these efforts are often directed predominately at limiting the
risk that employers will be sued rather than at preventing the toxic workplace
environments that the law intends to target.99 This occurs, Talesh explains, when
insurers transform multifactored legal rules into simple formulas that result in merely
symbolic compliance. The result, he finds, is that EPLI insurers ultimately
“undermine formal legal rights” by causing employers to become “lethargic” with
respect to the goals of employment law.100
3. Assessing the Evidence: Ordinary Commercial Insurers vs. Genuine Mutual
Niche Insurers
Examining the preceding evidence, it seems clear that there is significant variation
in both the incidence and effectiveness of insurers’ loss prevention efforts from
market to market and across different types of insurance entities. With respect to
conventional loss prevention efforts, this variation is quite dramatic. Insurers in some
markets, such as auto insurance and workers’ compensation, do indeed make
significant and quite effective use of conventional loss-prevention methods like
feature and experience rating.101 But insurers in other markets, such as D&O and
cyber insurance, often make minimal use of the most highly touted conventional loss
prevention efforts, such as offering premium savings that are conditioned on the
insured following insurers’ loss-prevention advice.102 Meanwhile, insurers in EPLI
markets make some efforts to influence policyholder behavior, but these efforts focus
less on reducing social harm than at limiting policyholder liability for this harm.
The evidence suggests that unconventional loss-prevention efforts are even more
limited and are concentrated in markets dominated by mutual insurers founded by
their policyholders, or in niche markets for kidnap or arctic shipping insurance.103
The outsized role that such insurers seem to play in pursuing unconventional loss
prevention strategies is consistent with the theoretical literature and some older
evidence. For instance, over two decades ago, George Cohen noted that “many,

98. Woods & Böhme, supra note 97.
99. See Legal Intermediaries, supra note 8, at 232–34.
100. Id. at 233–34; see Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate Governance, 54 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1913, 1955–57 (2021) (concluding that after #MeToo, EPLI insurers focused
more on corporate culture as opposed to compliance).
101. See supra Part I.B.
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. See Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1555–58; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 82, at 13.
But see Mendoza, supra note 8, at 416–26 (reporting that the niche insurers that cover school
boards engage in little such loss prevention). The identity of insureds, in addition to insurers,
may also plausibly influence the effectiveness of insurers’ loss prevention efforts. For
instance, certain insureds—such as non-profits or public entities—may be more receptive to
insurers’ loss prevention efforts than other policyholders.
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though not all, legal malpractice insurers that offer loss prevention services are
mutuals.”104 He explained this observation by suggesting that mutual insurers in the
legal malpractice sphere—like Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS),
which lawyers formed exclusively for the purpose of providing legal malpractice
insurance—can more effectively monitor policyholder care levels than ordinary
insurers because they can draw on and synthesize their members’ expertise. 105 By
contrast, there is little evidence of unconventional loss prevention undertaken by
ordinary profit-driven insurers, including the nominally mutual insurers that operate
in many large, property and casualty insurance markets.106 Indeed, most studies of
such insurance markets suggest that insurers often view these efforts as inconsistent
with maximizing profits. 107
Although these findings are in some tension with insurers’ frequently professed
focus on helping policyholders to prevent losses,108 what insurers say on their
websites and marketing materials, and what they actually do on a day-to-day basis,
are not necessarily the same. On the contrary, insurers have strong reasons to contend
that they provide significant risk mitigation services to policyholders irrespective of
the accuracy of this claim. Most obviously, such contentions suggest that their
insurance products provide value to policyholders that extends beyond the mere
payment of claims in the event of a loss. Additionally, emphasizing the riskmitigation services they provide may help insurers to attract actual or potentially
low-risk policyholders: the very same policyholders who are swayed by insurer
claims that they can help to reduce risk may be likely, on average, to have actual or
potentially favorable risk profiles in ways that would not be easy for the insurer to
identify independently. Finally, such claims help to promote a more favorable public
image of insurance as a tool not only to protect individual policyholders, but also to
promote broader social goals.
In short, there is limited evidence supporting the regulation thesis and
considerable evidence suggesting that the thesis is misleading. There is no question
that most insurers routinely employ some conventional loss-prevention techniques
that help to combat certain types of moral hazard. And some insurers, particularly
some genuine mutual insurers, provide their policyholders with more direct and
unconventional loss mitigation services. But the scope, impact, and breadth of these
different types of risk-mitigation efforts all appear to be varied and, in many settings,
quite limited.

104. See Cohen, supra note 49, at 340.
105. Id.
106. Many large property and casualty insurers have a mutual legal form but operate in
much the same manner as stock insurers. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 2–3.
See generally Erik F. Gerding, Remutualization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 797, 823–34 (2020)
(exploring explanations for the prominent use of the mutual form in insurance markets).
107. See supra Part I.B.
108. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 210 n.34 (reporting contentions made
on insurers’ websites).
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II. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONVENTIONAL LOSS-PREVENTION METHODS
Having described both the theory and evidence regarding regulation by insurance,
we now move to analysis and explanation. This Part focuses on the nature and limits
of conventional loss-prevention methods—those that can be operationalized through
traditional processes that insurers must typically maintain as an ordinary incident of
transferring risk. These strategies are often subdivided into four categories: riskbased pricing and underwriting, partial insurance, coverage restrictions, and ex post
loss management.
Because conventional loss-prevention strategies rely on relatively limited
engagement between insurers and policyholders outside of the ordinary touchpoints
of the insurance relationship, almost all insurers make some use of these techniques.
But as this Part argues, these methods often face significant obstacles to
meaningfully reducing the risk of loss and often serve alternative purposes for
insurers, such as enabling them to price coverage in ways that increase underwriting
profits or limit coverage for small claims that are relatively costly to process. And
even when, as is no doubt the case in some settings, these approaches reduce the risk
of loss, they are generally not capable of enabling insurance to have a net-positive
effect on loss prevention; despite the net-positive contentions in the literature,109
these approaches almost always merely reduce the size of the net-negative effect of
insurance on loss prevention.
A. Risk-Based Pricing and Underwriting
Risk-based pricing and underwriting are fundamental features of virtually all
forms of insurance. Insurers generally attempt to price coverage based on the risk
that applicants may incur insured losses and on the projected magnitude of such
losses.110 And insurers typically refuse to offer coverage to applicants that pose
excessive risks or risks that are too hard to measure.111 To accomplish these rating
and underwriting functions, insurers evaluate a broad range of information. 112 For
instance, commercial general liability insurers may vary the rate that they charge and

109. See, e.g., Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, 891 N.W. 2d 304 (Minn. 2017) (describing
a Minneapolis ballot-initiative that would have required the purchase of liability insurance by
all police officers); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 199 (“This Article develops the
opposite proposition—that insurance can reduce and in some cases solve, rather than create or
exacerbate, the moral hazard and related incentive problems.”); Lemann, supra note 5, at 56;
Lemnitzer, supra note 5, at 131; Lior, supra note 5; Kochenberger, supra note 5, at 1274;
Ramirez et al., supra note 5, at 439.
110. ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 67–68.
111. Some entries in the literature separately analyze rating and underwriting. We choose
to combine them because they ultimately impact loss prevention in similar ways; excessively
expensive insurance is often functionally equivalent to the unavailability of insurance.
112. Although much of this information is provided by applicants to insurers directly,
insurers also increasingly rely on external data sources about individual applicants’ risk that
that are sold by third-party vendors. See Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy
Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257,
1273 (2020).
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their willingness to offer coverage based on an applicant’s industry, size, geographic
location, and loss history, among many other factors.113 One of the collateral benefits
of risk-based pricing is that, in order to engage in this practice, insurers must collect
and aggregate loss and claims data, which sometimes sheds light on the level and
variation of risks that previously were not well-understood or quantifiable.
The principal purpose of risk-based pricing, however, is not generally to reduce
the risk of loss. Instead, risk-based pricing is typically directed principally at helping
insurers achieve other goals. Most obviously, risk-based pricing helps insurers to
charge premiums that will, over a large number of policyholders, ensure that
premiums collected will exceed claim payouts and thereby produce an underwriting
profit. It also helps insurers to attract comparatively “good risks”—those being
charged excessive premiums by competitors—and thereby to increase market share
and profits. By contrast, insurers that charge premiums that depart from each
applicant’s expected risk effectively force low-risk policyholders to cross-subsidize
comparatively high-risk policyholders. This creates the risk of adverse selection, as
those who believe they are being charged rates significantly in excess of their
expected risk choose to purchase coverage from a competitor, purchase less coverage
than they otherwise would, or forego insurance entirely.114
Two forms of risk-based pricing do, however, have the potential to impact loss
prevention.115 First, insurers can set rates based on features of the applicant’s current
operations or conduct at the time the insurer makes its underwriting and pricing
decision.116 This is “feature rating.” Second, insurers can take into account the
insured’s loss experience in past policy periods, either in the form of insurance
claims or events associated with claims, such as speeding tickets. This is “experience
rating.”117
Both feature rating and experience rating have the potential to mitigate risk by
creating incentives for insureds to take measures that will reduce their insurance
premiums. With respect to feature rating, this can occur if applicants alter their
activities or adopt precautions prior to a policy period based on the expectation that
doing so will decrease premiums. Experience rating, by contrast, can induce insureds
to take increased care so as to avoid losses while they are insured, in order to secure
favorable insurance rates in the future. But as we show below, feature rating and
experience rating often have limited capacity to induce these changes in the behavior
of insureds.

113. See JOSEPH F. MANGAN & CONNOR M. HARRISON, UNDERWRITING COMMERCIAL
LIABILITY 49–67 (2d ed. 2000) (surveying the factors used in classifying commercial liability
insurance risks).
114. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 6–7. See generally Peter Siegelman,
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
115. There are other factors that insurers employ to vary their rates across the board—for
example, changes in demand for coverage or in the scope of underlying tort law liabilities—
but the categories of feature and experience rating capture all the significant forms of riskbased pricing that differentiate among policyholders.
116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 71–72.
117. Id.
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1. The Limits of Feature Rating as a Loss-Prevention Tool
The capacity of feature rating to promote loss prevention is much touted in the
regulation-thesis literature.118 In large part, this is because feature rating may be able
to leverage the superior information of insurers relative to policyholders about the
effectiveness of specific precautions. Whereas an uninsured individual or company
may know little about which precautions are likely to meaningfully reduce their risk,
insurers may have quite good information on this front, given their access to reams
of data about policyholder characteristics and losses.119 For example, a property
insurer may have much more specific information about the fire-resistant properties
of different kinds of roofing material—metal, slate, shingle, etc.—than an insured
property owner. And a liability insurer may have more information about the safety
of certain kinds of parking lot designs than the developer of a small shopping center.
Insurers that set rates based in part on such policyholder features can, in theory,
induce policyholders to adopt relatively effective risk-mitigating measures in order
to reduce their insurance premiums.
Feature rating can also plausibly reduce risk by transmitting information to
policyholders about the risks of insured behavior that cannot be mitigated through
effective precautions. Such information can impact activity levels by causing
insureds to shift away from risky behavior. For instance, significant insurance costs
for homes in disaster-prone regions can induce individuals to purchase homes
elsewhere.120 Thus, recent indications that property insurers in Florida are likely to
raise their rates significantly in the wake of increasingly strong hurricanes linked to
climate change have led many to speculate that demand for coastal real estate in the
state may plummet.121 This type of information-forcing effect of insured activity is
particularly significant when it comes to individuals, who often underestimate the
risk of disasters.122
However, there are several key obstacles to these risk-mitigating benefits of
feature rating actually occurring, which collectively help to explain why there is such
mixed evidence documenting these effects.

118. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 206.
119. See id. at 200 (“[Insurance] supplies both the incentive and the know-how that
individuals and firms often lack, resulting in a more efficient level of accidents.”).
120. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather
Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571, 611–16 (2016); Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The
Perfect Storm: Hurricanes, Insurance, and Regulation, 12 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 106–
07 (2009).
121. See, e.g., Did Hurricane Ian Bust Florida’s Housing Market?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/18/podcasts/the-daily/hurricane-ianfloride-housing-market-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/RDU9-G76Z].
122. Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, 12 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 171, 171–72 (1996).
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a. Rating Factors Are Based on Correlation Rather Than Causation
Insurers typically have significant expertise in identifying correlations between
policyholder characteristics and the risk of loss.123 Indeed, one of the principal ways
that insurers compete in most markets is by using these correlations to help craft
underwriting and rating models.
But insurers can only use feature rating to induce specific precautions when they
can identify policyholder features that are causally connected to risk and reliably
estimate the magnitude of this effect.124 This type of expertise is quite different than
the ordinary expertise insurers must develop to identify correlations between
policyholder characteristics and loss expectations. In fact, identifying and estimating
such causal connections typically requires scientific, rather than actuarial, expertise.
It is for precisely this reason that the core actuarial standards governing risk-based
pricing specify that “it is not necessary for the actuary to establish a cause and effect
relationship between the risk characteristic and expected outcome in order to use a
specific risk characteristic.”125
This difficulty is well illustrated by auto and homeowners insurers’ use of creditbased information as a rating factor. Because there is a correlation between credit
ratings and the tendency to incur insured losses, many insurers use this information
to generate rates.126 But the causal pathways that underlie this correlation are highly
contested: some research suggests that individuals who are more careful are both
more likely to pay their bills when due and to avoid covered accidents, while others
claim that credit scores are predictive of claims because they proxy for income or
wealth.127 Either way, insurers’ use of credit information to price coverage cannot
reduce risk: to illustrate, a person who takes quick measures to improve their credit
score so as to achieve insurance savings is no less likely to be in a car accident.
Even when insurers do offer discounts to policyholders that adopt precautions,
that practice does not necessarily promote loss prevention. To be sure, insurers will
only offer discounts for precautions if policyholders who adopt those measures have
lower average losses than policyholders who do not. But this can occur even if the
precautions in question do not actually reduce the risk of loss. That is because
policyholders who adopt such precautions may be less likely to experience a claim
for reasons that are merely revealed, but not caused, by their actions. For instance,
an insured’s installation of an alarm system might not reduce the risk of loss, but
instead simply signal that they are the type of homeowner who takes care to prevent
home burglaries in a variety of ways. If so, then this use of feature rating would
merely facilitate the insurer’s identification of relatively low-risk homeowners
without actually reducing the risk of loss.

123. See generally Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 112.
124. A causal connection between policyholder features and risk is not necessary for
insurance premiums to impact activity levels of risky behavior.
125. E.g., ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRAC. NO. 12 § 3.2.2 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD.
2005). See also JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2000).
126. See Darcy Steeg Morris, Daniel Schwarcz & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Do Credit-Based
Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Policyholder Risk?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 397, 398 (2017).
127. See id.
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b. Secrecy and Non-Communication of Rating Factors
A second obstacle to reducing risk through feature rating is that insurers typically
have strong financial incentives to maintain the confidentiality of their risk
assessment formulas. Doing so allows insurers to retain their own low-risk
policyholders and to attract similarly low-risk policyholders from competitors. By
contrast, any insurer that disclosed detailed underwriting and rating information
would soon find its competitors exploiting this information to “skim” low-risk
policyholders and shield themselves from competition. 128 This reality undermines
the capacity of feature rating to reduce risk: keeping risk-based information
confidential prevents insurers from communicating to prospective or current
policyholders what specific measures they can take to reduce their premiums. 129
Of course, insurers are less likely to be secretive regarding discounts they offer
for intuitive precautions whose effectiveness is broadly appreciated. The availability
of such discounts reveals no information that the insurer had to invest in to
produce.130 For precisely that reason, however, such feature rating cannot plausibly
produce a net-positive effect on losses, as that possibility depends on insurers
leveraging their superior information to incentivize effective precautions that
uninsured policyholders would overlook.131

128. See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance
Antidiscrimination Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 208 (2014).
129. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 432–35 (2014). Of
course, this tendency toward secrecy can be overcome through collective action. For instance,
industry-wide rating organizations such as the Insurance Services Office publish rating
factors. See MANGAN & HARRISON, supra note 113, at 49–51. Additionally, states often require
insurers to publicly disclose their use of certain rating factors. See, e.g., Morris, Schwarcz, &
Teitelbaum, supra note 126, at 404 (discussing state laws requiring disclosure of insurer’s use
of credit information in rating and underwriting).
130. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16–18 (1978) (exploring how nondisclosure of information
protects a party’s investment in learning that information).
131. Even when insurers do publicly disclose discounts that they offer for specific
policyholder precautions, insurance intermediaries may not always inform applicants that
these discounts are available. Insurance agents and brokers are almost universally
compensated by commissions that are calculated as a percentage of premiums. See Daniel
Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, Insurance Agents in the 21st Century: The Problem of Biased
Advice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW (Daniel Schwarcz
& Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). Because riskier activities generate higher premiums, they also
generate higher commissions for agents and brokers. Moreover, insurance intermediaries
generally have no legal obligation to advise policyholders regarding loss mitigation measures
that might decrease premiums. See, e.g., Langwith v. Am. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 793 N.W.2d
215, 226 (Iowa 2010) (“There is a material distinction between insuring risk and avoiding risk,
and there are no circumstances present here that support a finding the parties agreed [the agent]
would advise the [policyholders] on risk avoidance.”). Taken together, these considerations
suggest that brokers and agents may sometimes have financial incentives not to inform
customers of potential discounts. Woods & Moore, supra note 49, at 24 (suggesting that
brokers’ interest in maximizing commissions militated against insurers’ incorporating cyber
insurance policy provisions designed to prevent loss). Of course, they may well have the
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c. Verification and Persistence Difficulties
Feature rating can reduce risk only when it focuses on precautions that are likely
to persist throughout the policy period. But many precautions are relatively easy for
policyholders to abandon or relax after a policy is issued, particularly if they were
adopted principally to reduce premiums. Consider a cyber insurer that discovers that
policyholders with certain software settings are at decreased risk of a ransomware
attack. That insurer could only offer a discount to insureds who changed their settings
if it were confident that insureds would not alter those settings after coverage was
bound. But policyholders may well abandon costly or inconvenient precautions; for
example if the software settings that limit ransomware attacks also impede easy
access to data, then policyholder personnel might over time seek work-arounds.
To be sure, insurers can reduce the risk that precautions adopted at the outset of a
policy period will thereafter be abandoned. Some precautions, for instance, may be
hard to reverse once they are adopted: a person who elevates her home in part to
secure lower flood insurance premiums is hardly likely to thereafter reverse this
safeguard. When this is not the case, insurers can condition coverage on
policyholders retaining precautions,132 or can audit policyholders at the end of each
policy period and adjust premiums accordingly. 133 But both of these strategies may
be costly or only partly reliable as they require the insurer to assess policyholder
information not just at the underwriting stage, when policyholders have a natural
incentive to share information, but at the claims or policy expiration stages, when
insureds’ incentives to reveal information may be reduced. Yet another option is for
insurers to use technology that directly tethers rates to ongoing policyholder behavior
or precautions, as with telematics in auto insurance.134 However, only a limited set
of policyholder activities or precautions can be reliably measured in real time via
technology in this way.135
d. Feature Rating and Control of Risk
A final obstacle to reducing risk through feature rating is that policyholders often
do not have a meaningful capacity to adjust features on which their premiums are
based.136 In some cases, for instance, these features turn on fundamental
characteristics of policyholders or their operations. For example, chainsaw
manufacturers may be charged higher premiums than pillow manufacturers, but this

opposite incentive depending on the circumstances, as informing policyholders of potential
discounts may earn insurance intermediaries long-term business.
132. For instance, the insured might be required to warrant that gasoline is not stored on
the premises.
133. Workers’ compensation insurers routinely audit policyholders’ payroll at the end of
the policy period and adjust premiums accordingly. See, e.g., Workers’ Comp
Audit,
THE
HARTFORD,
https://www.thehartford.com/workers-compensation/audit
[https://perma.cc/4WA7-XSRW].
134. See Panos Desyllas & Mari Sako, Profiting from Business Model Innovation:
Evidence from Pay-As-You-Drive Auto Insurance, 42 RSCH. POL’Y 101 (2013).
135. See infra Part II.A.3.
136. See Abraham, supra note 17, at 89–92.
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surely will not cause them to stop producing chainsaws. Similarly, policyholders’
rates may depend in part on their gross revenue or number of employees,137 but this
fact will infrequently cause insureds to limit their operations or payroll.
Admittedly, feature-rating may influence risk over the long term even if
policyholders do not have significant control over their riskiness when they initially
purchase coverage. Businesses and individuals engaging in an activity that is costly
to insure may seek exit strategies. Thus, the owner of a coastal home that is destroyed
in a hurricane may choose not to rebuild in part because of the anticipated costs of
insuring that property.138 Additionally, persistently high insurance rates for certain
activities may become general knowledge, which can, in turn, influence decisions
about whether to engage in that activity. As noted above, a prospective
homebuyer,might be aware that insurance prices are high for coastal homes, causing
them to purchase elsewhere.139
This is particularly likely when insurance costs are large relative to the broader
costs and benefits of the underlying activity, or when insurance is a practical
necessity to engage in the underlying activity. Returning to the homeownership
example, because purchasers of a home typically must finance their purchase with a
mortgage and annual homeowners insurance rates are an increasingly significant cost
of homeownership in areas like Florida, rate changes for such coverage can become
particularly salient even for prospective purchasers.140 In many other settings,
however, it seems unlikely that the signals sent by insurance premium-levels will be
sufficiently well-known in advance of most decisions about whether to engage in
particular long-term activities to have a substantial effect on those decisions.
2. The Limits of Experience Rating as a Loss-Prevention Tool
In contrast to feature rating, experience rating does not assess the riskiness of a
policyholder’s current operations or conduct. Instead, experience rating merely
predicts the policyholder’s future losses based on their past claims or loss
experiences that are highly correlated with such claims. When policyholders have
generalized awareness that future premiums will be calculated in this way, they will
have an incentive to avoid taking risks that could impact their future insurance rates.
This incentive effect of experience rating may cause policyholders to adjust their
safety levels, activity levels, or both.141 Adjusting safety levels involves increasing
the care with which a particular activity is conducted. The drivers of a company’s
delivery trucks, for example, may be instructed to drive three miles per hour under
the speed limit on highways. In contrast, adjusting activity levels involves modifying
the amount or kind of an activity in which a policyholder engages. Thus, that same
company may decide to ship its goods via FedEx to locations farther than twenty
miles from its stores instead of delivering these orders directly. But just as with

137. See MANGAN & HARRISON, supra note 113, at 59.
138. See Alexander B. Lemann, Assumption of Flood Risk, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163, 212–14
(2019).
139. See id. at 214–17.
140. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 162.
141. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5, 21 (1987)
(distinguishing between activity level and safety level effects produced by tort rules).

242

IN D IAN A LA W J O U RN AL

[Vol. 98:215

feature rating, the incentives created by experience rating will not always translate
into less risky behavior, for the following reasons.
a. Immediate Precaution Costs Must Be Compared to Uncertain Future Premium
Savings
Unlike feature rating, experience rating relies on insureds identifying
modifications of their activities or operations that may reduce future loss, and hence
result in lower future insurance premiums. Consequently, experience rating will
reduce the risk of loss only to the extent that insureds can (1) identify (perhaps with
their insurer’s assistance) adjustments to their activities or operations that may
reduce the risk of loss, and (2) determine that expected future premium savings
outweigh the present cost of making these adjustments. Experience-rating will thus
not cause a company to alter its delivery practices as imagined above if the company
does not believe that slower truck driving or increased use of third-party shipping
will reduce losses, or if it believes that these shifts in its practices would produce
costs that outweigh any future premium savings that they would generate.
The extent to which insureds can, in fact, identify precautions whose benefits (in
the form of decreased future premiums) exceed their costs is highly context specific.
But several factors make such scenarios likely to be uncommon. First, the costs of
adopting new precautions are certain, whereas the future premium savings they may
produce are highly contingent. In our experience, insurers rarely commit to reducing
premiums if losses are lower than expected, nor do they specify the magnitude of
anticipated reductions. Conversely, increased losses will not necessarily trigger
future premium increases. After all, insurers that experience-rate do not necessarily
do so for all claims; many auto insurers, for instance, increase rates only for accidents
in which their insured was at fault.142 Meanwhile, numerous other factors, such as
premium changes resulting from insurance underwriting cycles, 143 can mitigate or
even entirely offset the impact of loss experience on premiums.
Second, whereas the costs of adopting precautions are immediate, the benefits of
future premium savings are delayed. Because most policies are annually renewable,
premium savings from precautions or adjustments in activities will ordinarily not be
realized for at least a year. Even then, only a small percentage of potential savings
may be realized, as premiums savings may be spread over multiple future policy
years. Consequently, the potential savings from experience rating may be quite
distant for policyholders when they choose whether to adopt precautions. This is
significant as individuals often disproportionately weigh immediate costs and
benefits relative to future payouts.144
Even when these hurdles can be overcome, experience rating is unlikely to cause
insurance to produce a net-positive effect on risk. In the absence of insurance, a loss

142. See Emily Delbridge, When a Not-at-Fault Claim Can Raise Your Insurance Costs,
THE BALANCE (May 3, 2022), https://www.thebalance.com/can-a-not-at-fault-claim-raisemy-insurance-rates-527469 [https://perma.cc/92LZ-ADCH].
143. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles,
10 CONN. INS. L.J. 255 (2003).
144. See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and to
Be Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273 (2015).
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would produce immediate and certain costs for a firm or individual. Insurance with
experience rating, by contrast, means that an accident will produce a delayed and
contingent loss for the policyholder. As such, uninsured firms and individuals would
tend to have even better reason to adopt effective precautions than insured
policyholders with experience-rated coverage. To the extent that such precautions
are suggested or implemented with the assistance of an experience-rating insurer,
then uninsured firms could purchase similar expertise from non-insurer consultants.
b. Experience-Rating Is Uncommon in Many Coverage Lines
Insurers in many lines of coverage make only limited use of experience rating. In
some cases, this is because a single claim may provide only limited evidence about
the likelihood of future losses. This is particularly common when claims are
relatively rare and frequently influenced by factors beyond policyholders’ control,
as is the case in medical malpractice insurance markets where experience rating has
historically been rare.145 In other cases, insurers may not experience-rate because
claims may actually decrease the risk of future claims by revealing vulnerabilities
that can be remediated. This might plausibly be the case in some cyber insurance
settings, for example, where firms that experience a cyberattack can potentially
benefit from the advice of sophisticated technology consultants to help them
diagnose how their cyber defenses were breached and how they can prevent such
intrusions in the future.146
Even when past claims are indeed reliable indicators of future risk, insurers may
have good reasons to limit experience rating. For instance, significant premium
increases of any type are likely to cause insureds to shop elsewhere for coverage. 147
But retaining legacy business is often profitable because of the onetime costs
associated with new policyholders, such as underwriting expenses. Insurers selling
multiple forms of coverage to a policyholder may also worry that increasing rates for
one type of coverage due to a claim may result in their losing all of the policyholder’s
business.148 In addition, insurers can sometimes attract insureds by promising not to

145. See Michelle M. Mello, Michael D. Frakes, Erik Blumenkranz & David M. Studdert,
Malpractice Liability and Health Care Quality: A Review, 323 JAMA 352, 364 (2020); Gary
M. Fournier & Melayne Morgan McInnes, The Case for Experience Rating in Medical
Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Evaluation, 68 J. RISK & INS. 255 (2001).
146. See Daniel Schwarcz, Josephine Wolff & Daniel Woods, Do the Legal Rules
Governing the Confidentiality of Cyber Incident Response Undermine Cyber Security?,
LAWFARE (Jan. 5, 2022, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-legal-rules-governingconfidentiality-cyber-incident-response-undermine-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/5U4WN3G8].
147. See Maddy Varner & Aaron Sankin, Suckers List: How Allstate’s Secret Auto
Insurance Algorithm Squeezes Big Spenders, THE MARKUP (Feb. 25, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://themarkup.org/allstates-algorithm/2020/02/25/car-insurance-suckers-list
[https://perma.cc/D96B-DZJU] (describing how Allstate’s “customer retention” model
delayed price increases to limit the risk of policy cancellation or switching from “sticker
shock”).
148. See Tina Harrison & Jake Ansell, Customer Retention in the Insurance Industry:
Using Survival Analysis to Predict Cross-Selling Opportunities, 6 J. FIN. SERV. MKTG. 229
(2002).
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experience-rate, and thus to protect them against the risk of future premium
increases.149 This practice is most explicit where insurers issue guaranteed renewable
policies, which restrict premium increases based on individualized loss
experience.150 But it can also occur in other settings; for instance, some auto insurers
sell policies with “accident forgiveness,” meaning that they will not increase their
rates due to a single accident.151 Similarly, some insurers cap the impact of very large
losses on future premiums or spread out the impact of large losses over multiple
years in order to smooth out premium changes.152
c. Questionable Impact Where Demand is Limited
A third impediment to effective experience rating is that policyholders may not
need to purchase insurance in the future if their rates increase significantly. To be
sure, some policyholders may not view dropping coverage in response to price
increases to be practical or desirable. Even so, these policyholders can partially offset
increased premiums from experience rating in other ways, such as by purchasing less
coverage or increasing their deductible.
3. Reevaluating the Evidence
The significant obstacles to effective loss prevention through risk-based pricing
help to explain why there is such mixed evidence that ordinary profit-maximizing
insurers use these techniques to effectively promote loss prevention. 153 They also
help to explain the settings in which risk-based pricing has been shown to help
prevent losses. Consider experience rating first: as Part I noted, significant evidence
suggests that experience rating in workers’ compensation insurance helps to reduce
workplace accidents.154 This makes sense given that workers’ compensation claims
are relatively common; consequently, increased loss rates for an insured can provide
a statistically reliable indicator of future losses.155 Additionally, employers that
implement effective workplace precautions and procedures can thereby receive a
significant and immediate benefit independent of future premiums savings: a
healthier and more reliable workforce.156 Finally, for all but the largest employers,

149. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Pierre-André Chiappori, Classification Risk and its
Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC OF INSURANCE LAw (Daniel Schwarcz
& Peter Siegelman eds., 2015); Bradley Herring & Mark V. Pauly, Incentive-Compatible
Guaranteed Renewable Health Insurance Premiums, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 395 (2006).
150. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 352.
https://www.allstate.com/auto151. See
Accident
Forgiveness,
ALLSTATE,
insurance/accident-forgiveness.aspx [perma.cc/L2RP-DG63].
152. See, e.g., CONNOR & GALLAGHER ONESOURCE, How Experience Modification Factor
Impacts Work Comp Insurance Premium, https://www.gocgo.com/blog/experiencemodification-factor [perma.cc/J7UQ-XQHW].
153. See supra Part I.B.
154. See id.
155. See Jeff Biddle & Karen Roberts, Claiming Behavior in Workers’ Compensation, 70
J. RISK & INS. 759 (2003).
156. See Christopher Henry, Death by Dicta: The Life of the Sophisticated User Doctrine
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specific amounts of workers’ compensation insurance are typically mandated by
state law; employers that experience significant rate increases due to past losses
cannot, therefore, simply drop or reduce coverage.157
Risk-based pricing in the form of feature rating, rather than experience rating, can
also help to prevent losses where the obstacles described above are limited. The best
examples involve settings where policyholder features have an intuitive causal
connection to short-term risk, are relatively hard for policyholders to change during
the policy period in ways that can be hidden from insurers, and are within the
practical capacity of the insured to alter. Thus, a property insurer may offer a
discount to insureds that install an automatic sprinkler system,158 or an environmental
liability insurer may offer discounts to policyholders that use storage tanks that are
less prone to corrosion over time.159 Similarly, an auto insurer may increase prices
when teenage drivers are added to a policy, thus reducing the incidence of teenage
driving.160 But such intuitive and presumptively effective loss-prevention measures
are much less likely to be available in lines like cyber and D&O insurance, where
risk is more complicated and dynamic.
Another important example where the obstacles to feature rating described above
are likely to be minimal involves scenarios in which premiums can have significant
long-term effects on activity levels. Importantly, this may well be the case with
respect to property investment in areas impacted by climate change, like Florida.
Increasing insurance premiums for coastal property in that state may, over the next
several years or decades, decrease development in those regions, particularly since
homeowners insurance is a prerequisite to securing a mortgage.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, understanding the barriers insurers face in
using risk-based pricing to reduce risk helps to illuminate the contexts in which
technological innovations really do have the potential to significantly reduce risk,
perhaps even in ways that could produce net positive results. The key example here
involves the use of telematics by auto insurers. As noted in Part I, available evidence
suggests that telematics can indeed significantly reduce risky driving behavior. 161
The promise of telematics in auto insurance stems from its particular capacity to
overcome virtually all of the challenges to using risk-based pricing to reduce risk
that we identified above. Most obviously, telematics can provide insurers with
significant information regarding policyholders’ driving behavior at essentially zero
marginal cost.162 This allows insurers to overcome verification and precaution-

in South Carolina Products Liability Law, 69 S.C. L. REV. 1039, 1059 (2018).
157. See Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
985, 1000 (2012).
158. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 224 (reporting that some insurers offer
such a discount).
159. Yin, Kunreuther & White, supra note 69, at 327.
160. Auto insurers can charge more to cover families with teenage drivers in part because
they can easily identify whether a teenager was driving when an accident occurred. See, e.g.,
Rose Anne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of
the Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 499 (Georges
Dionne ed., 1992).
161. See supra Part I.B.
162. By contrast, telematic technology cannot plausibly provide key risk-based
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persistence problems with respect to feature rating. Auto insurers that use telematics
also retain ownership and control over the data they collect, which helps them to
avoid problems associated with maintaining the secrecy of their risk-based formulas
while nonetheless communicating risk-based information to policyholders.163
Telematics also can largely solve the problem of effective experience rating typically
requiring insureds to compare the costs of precautions to uncertain future benefits,
because telematics programs can provide prompt and reliable information to insureds
about the cost savings that their behaviors will generate.
The promise of telematics, moreover, stems not just from the power of technology
to eliminate information asymmetries and time lags, but also from several distinctive
characteristics of driving risk. For instance, many of the causal elements of driving
risk, such as speeding, sudden acceleration, and driving routes, are well understood
and mostly within the control of insureds. Additionally, certain forms of auto
insurance are legally required as a condition of driving in most states,164 making
demand for such coverage relatively inelastic. Finally, insureds have significant
nonpecuniary reasons to want to avoid auto accidents, given the obvious
noneconomic harms that serious auto accidents can produce. All of this suggests that
efforts to expand telematics to other settings that lack these characteristics, such as
in identifying police misconduct,165 will face significant obstacles.
Of course, the potential for telematics to significantly reduce risk is just that:
potential. Telematics are currently voluntary and only a small percentage of insureds
opt for insurance programs that employ telematics.166 In large part, drivers’
reluctance to embrace telematics involves privacy concerns,167 posing the question
whether the benefits of round-the-clock behavioral observation of policyholder
behavior are worth its costs.
Ultimately, insurers can and do use both feature rating and experience rating to
help limit the risk of moral hazard. But these tools have important limits. And, in
most cases, these limits mean that even when risk-based pricing can partially
counteract moral hazard, it cannot reduce risk levels below those that would obtain

information to insurers in most lines of insurance. For instance, telematics cannot deliver
observations of a corporate officers’ decision-making process. Even in the auto insurance
setting, telematics may not fully communicate relevant information, such as drivers’
awareness of deterioration of their vehicles’ parts or handling.
163. See Jin & Vasserman, supra note 30, at 2.
164. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 713–14.
165. See
Special
Order
of
the
Chief
of
Police
No.
13,
https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/2021/09/
SO-13-2020_Telematics-System-Established.pdf [perma.cc/M8F4-DC8E].
166. See Mitchell Scrimgeour-Brown, Telematics “A Total Game Changer” for Auto
Insurers,
INS.
BUS.
AM .
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/commercial-auto/telematics-a-total-gamechanger-for-auto-insurers-259488.aspx [https://perma.cc/2GC5-RH9M ] (noting that only six
percent of consumers in the US are enrolled in telematics programs).
167. The phrase is borrowed from a 1977 law review article that refers to the nightmare of
total legal indeterminacy and the dream of total determinacy. H.L.A. Hart, American
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV.
969 (1977).
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in the absence of insurance. Insurance will still have a net-negative effect on loss
prevention.
B. Partial Insurance: Loss Sharing Provisions
A second conventional approach to loss prevention is “partial” insurance. This is
loss sharing by the insured, consisting of deductibles, coinsurance, or maximum
monetary limits on coverage.168 Partial insurance can limit moral hazard by requiring
the policyholder to bear some of the risk of loss, and thus partially removing the
underlying source of moral hazard. In that sense, partial insurance does not “combat”
moral hazard at all, but simply limits its creation in the first place. For this reason,
partial insurance cannot have a net-positive effect on loss prevention—it cannot
plausibly reduce risk levels below those that would obtain in the absence of
insurance, because partial insurance is itself the absence of insurance.
As with risk-based premiums, even the capacity of partial insurance to reduce
moral hazard depends on several conditions that are not always satisfied. First, partial
insurance limits moral hazard only when precautions that reduce the policyholders’
risk of incurring uninsured expenses simultaneously reduce the insurer’s risk of
incurring covered losses. In most cases, this condition is met. To illustrate, a property
insurance policy containing a deductible may increase the care that an insured would
take to avoid a fire of any type, as small fires can easily become much larger.
However, occasionally a policyholder can differentiate among precautions that
impact loss-sharing expenses and those that impact insurance payouts. For example,
a homeowner covered by flood insurance might place sandbags in front of their doors
during a hurricane to prevent leakage under the sills. Doing so might prevent small
amounts of water damage falling within the policy’s deductible, but not prevent
major insured damage if flood waters rose several feet and flooded the home through
other avenues of entry. In such cases, partial insurance is less effective in causing the
policyholder to avoid insured loss. But this kind of bifurcation is probably rare.
Second, insurers may sometimes be reluctant to make significant use of partial
insurance. Most individual liability insurance does not include any deductible or
coinsurance, probably because such provisions might cause policyholders to delay
reporting potential suits to insurers.169 Property insurance coverage, meanwhile,
often includes deductibles that are quite small compared to coverage limits, in large
part because individuals prefer small deductibles.170 More generally, large losssharing provisions can undermine the principal benefit of coverage: protecting
insureds against the risk of significant financial loss.171
Even when insurance policies do include loss-sharing provisions, the primary
purpose of these provisions may not be to combat moral hazard. For instance, the

168. See supra Part I.A.
169. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 6, at 1429–30.
170. See, e.g., Justin Sydnor, (Over)insuring Modest Risks, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON.
177 (2010).
171. This concern has been particularly salient in the health insurance context, where loss
sharing can impose huge costs on even those with coverage. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya
Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L.
& ETHICS 239 (2010).
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relatively small deductibles included in property insurance policies may do little to
combat moral hazard, but nonetheless serve the valuable purpose of limiting
coverage for small losses.172 Doing so is economically sensible given the fixed costs
of claims processing and the limited value to policyholders of insurance against
relatively small losses.173 Similarly, coverage limits in property insurance policies
typically are not designed to induce care, but instead to specify the value or
replacement cost of insured property so as to cap insurer liability. 174 Liability
insurance coverage limits often serve a similar purpose, as evidenced by how few
litigants seek to (or could) collect against insureds’ personal assets.175
Third, the capacity of partial insurance to combat moral hazard depends on the
policyholder's ability to identify cost-effective measures that reduce the risk of loss.
For many of the same reasons we discussed earlier, this will often be difficult or
impossible.176 Consider, for instance, the health insurance context. As noted in Part
I, compelling evidence shows that cost-sharing provisions in health insurance reduce
insureds’ use of health care in part because such cost sharing is often quite expansive
and salient.177 What is much less clear, however, is the extent to which these shortterm reductions in healthcare consumption limit wasteful or unnecessary care or
instead cause insureds to forego medically necessary care.178 In the latter scenario,
cost-sharing provisions may actually increase long-term losses by causing minor
health problems to increase in severity before they are treated.179

172. As noted in Part I, there is some evidence suggesting a reduction in risk in Taiwan
when insurers introduced a deductible that increased during a policy year when the insured
was in a car accident. See supra Part I.B. However, the deductible in these cases was more
significant as a percentage of total loss than is common in the United States. Additionally,
increased deductibles facing drivers who experienced an accident were salient and recent in
this setting.
173. See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, “You Want Insurance with That?”; Using
Behavioral Economics to Protect Consumers from Add-on Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS.
L.J. 1, 4 (2013); Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3
ERASMUS L. REV. 23, 26–27 (2010).
174. See Peter Molk, Playing with Fire? Testing Moral Hazard in Homeowners Insurance
Valued Policies, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 347.
175. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 275, 304–08 (2001); David A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles
Silver, Settlement at Policy Limits and the Duty to Settle: Evidence from Texas, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 48 (2011). Enterprises with substantial assets do face the risk of above-limits
liability, but in our experience this risk is minimal because coverage limits typically are quite
high (often in the hundreds of millions of dollars).
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. See supra Part I.B. As of 2022, the legal cap on cost sharing was approximately
$8,700 for individuals and $17,400 for families. Out-of-Pocket Maximum/Limit,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/out-of-pocket-maximum-limit
[perma.cc/5R5Q-LJFG]. The salience of such cost sharing is also impacted by the fact that
insureds must incur such cost sharing each time they receive care, which is quite typical.
178. See Thomas Rice & Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate
Utilization and Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 MED. CARE RSCH. &
REV. 415 (2004).
179. See Geetesh Solanki & Helen Halpin Schauffler, Cost-Sharing and the Utilization of
Clinical Preventive Services, 17 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 127 (1999).
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C. Coverage Restrictions and Exclusions
Restrictions on and exclusions from coverage have long been emphasized as
potential methods of combating moral hazard.180 Most insurance policies, however,
do not attempt to achieve this result through general negligence exclusions or
provisions conditioning coverage on the insured exercising reasonable care to avoid
a loss.181 Such provisions would be self-defeating in liability insurance, the major
purpose of which is to insure against liability for negligence. Similarly, neither
property, life, nor health insurance policies typically contain such provisions because
policyholders demand coverage against loss caused by their own carelessness and
are willing to pay for it.182 Instead, the approach insurance typically employs is to
incorporate restrictions directed at specific forms of risky conduct.183
Like partial insurance, specific coverage exclusions principally reduce moral
hazard by limiting its creation in the first place rather than by affirmatively
counteracting moral hazard. For example, an insured whose property insurance
excluded damage to a garage would not therefore exercise more care to avoid such
damage than they would have exercised without coverage. Rather, the insured simply
never experiences any reduction in their baseline incentive to protect the garage.
Meanwhile, the garage exclusion does nothing to combat the moral hazard created
by insuring the insured’s house.
Unlike partial insurance, however, specific coverage provisions can, in principle,
reduce risk in ways that extend beyond merely not creating moral hazard in the first
place. Such risk reduction can occur if these coverage restrictions indirectly convey
to policyholders the insurer’s superior information about effective precautions and
cause the insured to alter their behavior accordingly. Consider, for instance, the
exclusion in homeowners’ policies for frozen pipes in vacant homes when heat is not
maintained and the water is not shut off. 184 This exclusion might alert otherwise
unsuspecting insureds to the desirability of shutting off their water when they leave
their home for extended periods of time.
In order for such coverage restrictions to prevent losses at all, however, insureds
must understand or anticipate these restrictions when they make decisions relevant
to risk. When such coverage restrictions are not appreciated by insureds, the net
effect is simply to shift the risk of loss onto insureds without reducing that risk at
all.185 A homeowner who is unaware of the frozen-pipe exclusion, for example, will
not be influenced by its existence.186 The extent to which policyholders are aware of

180. See, e.g., George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire
Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 410, 415 (1937).
181. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1263, 1284–85 (2011).
182. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 274.
183. See Schwarcz, supra note 181, at 1284–85.
184. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 274–75.
185. Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency
in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 425 (2014).
186. The only economic study examining how policy terms impacted moral hazard that we
could locate was Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, Replacement Cost Endorsement and
Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance, 24 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 213 (2002), which
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coverage restrictions when they make risk-relevant decisions varies. In most settings,
however, any such awareness usually will not take the form of continuous and
explicit knowledge of coverage details before a loss occurs or becomes relatively
likely; even the most sophisticated policyholders only examine the details of their
insurance coverage when they purchase coverage or a loss occurs. 187
Instead, the mechanisms by which coverage restrictions are likely to influence
risk-relevant behavior will tend to take one of three more indirect forms. First,
policyholders may be vaguely aware that their insurance limits coverage if they take
specific risks but have no concrete sense of exactly how such coverage restrictions
work. This type of limited awareness could well influence policyholder care levels:
for instance, a homeowner might be careful to turn off their home’s water when they
leave it unoccupied simply because they anticipate the possibility that failing to do
so could result in uncovered losses.188 On the other hand, the unconscious moral
hazard, which we mentioned in Part I, might operate in the other direction,
discouraging the insured from bothering with this type of precaution. Second,
policyholders may become aware of specific coverage restrictions or conditions after
a loss occurs or appears relatively likely, triggering policyholder efforts to limit
ultimate losses. Policyholders are, of course, more likely to inquire about the details
of their coverage after property has been damaged or a loss appears likely. 189 Third,
policyholders operating with the advice of insurers may take note of coverage
limitations or conditions at the outset of a policy term and implement procedures or
policies designed to preserve coverage if a loss does occur. For instance, a catering
company may train its employees to dispose of all unconsumed food after an event
due to limitations in its liability insurance for food poisoning resulting from
consumption of food after a catered event. Such preemptive precautions are
particularly likely to be adopted by policyholders who are advised by sophisticated
brokers or intermediaries who specialize in advising insureds about how to manage
their risks in light of their insurance coverage.
Among these three pathways, only the third—in which insureds translate
coverage restrictions into routinized practices or policies—can plausibly cause
insurance to have a net-positive impact on loss prevention. To illustrate, the catering

found that replacement cost coverage in automobile insurance policies increases the
probability of theft claims. They conclude that their findings suggest opportunistic fraud rather
than ex ante moral hazard. Insureds committing such fraud have an opportunity to carefully
consult their policy terms beforehand.
187. See generally Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40 FLA.
STATE UNIV. L. REV. 305, 305 (2013); Molk, supra note 174, at 352 (showing that valued
policy laws do not influence losses, presumably because most insureds are not aware of these
laws). Unlike in health insurance, losses in most lines of property/casualty insurance are
relatively uncommon, meaning there are limited opportunities for policyholders and their
personnel to learn over time about the features of this coverage.
188. Such generalized awareness of coverage limitations may also cause policyholders
facing unusual circumstances to check the terms of their coverage by contacting their insurer
or agent.
189. See Boardman, supra note 187, at 330; Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in
Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457, 1471–76 (2017). It is for precisely this reason that
most property/casualty policies impose heightened duties of care on policyholders at or after
the time of a loss. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 212.
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company’s instructions to employees may reduce the risk of food poisoning
compared to a scenario where the caterer was uninsured and failed to appreciate the
risk of food poisoning from the consumption of leftovers.190 By contrast, a
policyholder who moderates their risk-taking due to a generalized awareness of
coverage restrictions would presumably take even greater precautions if they were
uninsured and thus bear the full cost of their lack of care. There is no opportunity, in
this scenario, for coverage terms to indirectly convey the insurer’s expertise about
effective precautions. Similarly, coverage restrictions that an insured discovers after
a loss are unlikely to cause them to take greater care than they would have taken if
they were uninsured; an uninsured person who discovers a potential or ongoing loss
has strong reason to mitigate that loss and the capacity to hire an expert to help them
with that effort if necessary.
Ultimately, then, coverage restrictions can prevent losses, sometimes in ways that
may even go beyond merely counteracting moral hazard. But in order to reduce risk
at all, policyholders must have some knowledge of these policy provisions when they
make relevant decisions, and that often will not be the case.
D. Ex Post Loss Management
The final category of conventional loss-prevention techniques involves lossmanagement services that insurers provide or facilitate once policyholders inform
them that a potentially covered loss has occurred. This is a conventional form of loss
prevention (or reduction) because it is part of an insurer’s typical claimsmanagement operations. But unlike other conventional loss-prevention techniques,
loss-management services are principally concerned with combatting ex post moral
hazard, which arises when insureds do not make sufficient efforts to limit the
magnitude of loss once it has begun to occur.191 By contrast, these services do little
to help insureds reduce the risk of suffering a loss in the first place.
The extensiveness of insurer-provided loss-management services varies across
lines of insurance. In our experience, property insurers, for instance, typically
provide only limited loss-management services, such as supplying policyholders
with information about the appropriate cost of repairs and preferred service
providers. Cyber insurers, by contrast, often offer extensive post-breach services that
include helping policyholders restore lost data, negotiate with ransomware hackers,
and navigate regulatory and legal requirements.192 And, of course, loss management
is a core feature of liability insurance: most liability insurance policies provide the

190. Even relatively obscure coverage exclusions might reduce risk in this way.
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies, for instance, exclude coverage for liability that
an insured voluntarily assumes via contract. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 468.
For that reason, an insured might plausibly alter its contracting practices to only accept
indemnification clauses when doing so would not jeopardize its insurance coverage, while it
might not have adopted this practice in the absence of insurance.
191. See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J.
29, 66 (2012).
192. See WOLFF, supra note 94; Woods & Böhme, supra note 97, at 19–21.
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insurer with substantial control over the defense and settlement of a suit against the
insured.193
There is little doubt that these types of insurer-provided loss-management
services frequently help to limit ex post moral hazard. In the absence of such
services, policyholders would often fail to mitigate the costs of an insured loss, given
that it would be their insurer’s money, rather than their own, that was on the line.
Because insurance coverage looms large after a covered loss has occurred,
policyholders typically appreciate this reality. These dynamics are most obvious in
the liability insurance setting where policyholders in control of defense and
settlement might immediately settle a case at their coverage limits or direct their
insurance defense counsel to spend exorbitant resources to defend the claim, though
the prospect of experience-rating in subsequent years might minimally reduce this
risk.194
Not all loss-management efforts by insurers, however, are in fact designed to
combat ex post moral hazard. Perhaps just as often—as we indicate below—their
purpose is to shift losses onto policyholders or third parties or to avoid litigation
rather than to reduce the magnitude of these losses.195 The prospect that insurers’
loss-management services may inappropriately shift losses onto others has resulted
in various legal and regulatory strategies designed to safeguard policyholder and
public interests. Market forces can also restrict insurers’ capacity to push lossmanagement efforts too far: a D&O insurer, for instance, may agree to settle a
questionable claim against its insured because failing to do so could impede future
demand for its products.196
The inevitable need for legal, regulatory, and market forces to ensure that
insurers’ loss-management efforts do not inappropriately shift losses onto
policyholders or third parties blunts insurers’ capacity to effectively limit ex post
moral hazard. This is because the boundary line between these two characterizations
of insurers’ loss-management efforts is so contestable. Do auto insurers’ efforts to
steer policyholders to favored repair shops and Non-Original Equipment
Manufactured (“Non-OEM”) parts combat moral hazard or unreasonably limit
policyholder recovery? How often do health insurers deny coverage for care that they
claim is not medically necessary despite convincing evidence to the contrary? And
when should liability insurers accept settlement offers in cases they believe their
policyholder is likely to win when there is a significant risk of an excess judgment if
they are wrong? Because answering such questions is notoriously difficult, legal,
regulatory, and market forces often limit insurers’ capacity to aggressively fight ex
post moral hazard in an effort to prevent inappropriate shifting of losses onto others.
Even when insurers successfully overcome these barriers to ex post loss
management, these efforts generally will not reduce risk below levels that would

193. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 615, 651–52; see Charles Silver, Basic
Economics of the Defense of Covered Claims, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF INSURANCE LAW (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, eds., 2015).
194. Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurers’ Right to Defend Their Insureds, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 115 (2001).
195. See Avraham & Porat, supra note 7, at 8–18.
196. See ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 193 (discussing the incentives for settlement created
by the threat of insurers' liability for judgments in excess of their policy limits).
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exist in the absence of insurance. To be sure, insurers may well develop expertise in
loss management that they can share with their insureds.197 But, as suggested above,
uninsured parties who experience a loss have good reason to manage the resulting
costs efficiently on their own. And to the extent that they do not have the expertise
to do this, they can hire others to assist them in this endeavor when they experience
an actual or potential loss. Indeed, this is exactly what many insurers do.198
Moreover, while insurers may have an incentive to shirk on loss mitigation or repair
services because the benefits of such services flow partially to policyholders,
uninsured individuals and entities have good incentives to balance cost and quality
considerations when selecting loss mitigation and repair services in the wake of a
loss.
III. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF UNCONVENTIONAL LOSS-PREVENTION METHODS
This Part turns to unconventional loss-prevention methods, which operate outside
the confines of ordinary insurance processes that are required to transfer risk from
insured to insurer. These loss-prevention methods tend to require repeated
interactions between insurers and policyholders during the policy period or longterm insurer efforts to coordinate and influence third parties such as scientists,
engineers, and policymakers. Often, they consist of the direct provision of lossprevention services rather than the conventional creation of economic incentives for
the policyholder to prevent losses from occurring. Much of the literature canvassed
in Part I emphasizes the (purported) capacity of insurers to effectively deploy such
unconventional methods of loss-prevention. In theory, such loss-prevention efforts
can benefit policyholders and insurers alike: by decreasing losses, effective loss
prevention can drive down covered losses, which can both reduce premiums and
attract more future customers. As we saw, however, the actual evidence suggests that
unconventional loss-prevention efforts by insurers are uncommon, especially for
insurers that operate outside of niche markets and are not genuine mutuals.199
This Part explains the gap between the theory underlying the regulation thesis and
empirical reality by showing that insurers operating in competitive commercial
markets typically face significant, and often insurmountable, obstacles to effectively
implementing unconventional loss-prevention methods. In many contexts, these
efforts would be costly, have an uncertain impact on claims (and hence future
premiums), expose insurers to potential tort liability, and risk generating significant
policyholder pushback. In addition, the widespread dissemination of these methods
is not often in insurers’ collective interest because they would risk blunting aggregate
demand for coverage.
To advance the analysis, we divide unconventional loss-prevention methods into
two categories based on the identity of the parties with whom insurers must engage
to reduce the risk of loss. Section A focuses on direct insurer engagement with

197. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 210.
198. In many settings, insurers do not provide loss mitigation advice directly but through
independent third-party experts such as lawyers, forensic experts, or engineers. See, e.g.,
Woods & Böhme, supra note 97, at 19–21 (exploring how cyber insurers use third-party
providers to help policyholders respond to a cyber incident).
199. See supra Part I.B.
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policyholders outside of the conventional touchpoints of the insurance relationship.
Such possible loss-prevention efforts include providing policyholders with riskrelated information, advising or coaching policyholders, and providing riskmitigation and early detection services to policyholders. Section B then turns to
potential loss-prevention mechanisms that bypass policyholders entirely, such as
insurer influence of public policy or production of risk-reducing technologies.
Ultimately, we conclude, ordinary insurers’ practical capacity to profitably deploy
either set of strategies is limited, an assessment that helps to explain the evidence
finding minimal use of unconventional loss-prevention strategies by most insurers.
A. Direct Insurer Engagement with Policyholders
The most highly touted unconventional mechanisms for insurers to reduce the risk
of loss involve direct and repeated interactions between insurer and policyholder. 200
These interactions are often described as sophisticated consulting services that the
insurer provides in conjunction with coverage and which policyholders accept, at
least in part, because of the implicit or explicit threat that insurers will otherwise
raise rates or limit coverage.
In theory, such direct risk-mitigation efforts have the capacity to allow insurance
to generate net-positive effects on loss prevention.201 This potential arises from
insurers’ relative sophistication in understanding and managing risk, which they can
leverage to advise policyholders on new precautions, policies, or practices. By
contrast, even uninsured firms and individuals that have strong financial reasons to
manage risk may lack the sophistication, data, and awareness necessary to accurately
assess which policies and precautions are likely to accomplish this goal costeffectively.
The literature provides some evidence that such unconventional methods have the
potential to reduce the risk of loss in some contexts.202 And there are even indications
that these efforts can help policyholders to adopt precautions that they might neglect
in the absence of insurance. But the relative dearth of such evidence reflects several
key limitations on direct efforts by insurers to limit policyholder risk.203

200. See supra Part I.A.
201. See, e.g., DAVE JONES ET AL., THE NATURE CONSERVANCY & WILLIS TOWERS
WATSON, WILDFIRE RESILIENCE INSURANCE: QUANTIFYING THE RISK REDUCTION OF
ECOLOGICAL
FORESTRY
WITH
INSURANCE
2–8
(2021),
https://www.nature.org/content/dam/tnc/nature/en/documents/FINALwildfireresilienceinsura
nce6.27.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8UT-QBBV] (concluding that insurers could substantially
reduce wildfire risk and insurance premiums by encouraging appropriate ecological forestry
approaches in California while acknowledging that private insurers have not, to date, done
much to advance this goal).
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. See Logue, supra note 6, at 1357 (noting that direct insurer regulation of
policyholders, consisting of, for instance, inspecting insured’s premises and offering
customized advice about reducing risks, is “surprisingly uncommon”).
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1. Directly Influencing Policyholder Behavior is Costly for Insurers
The cost to insurers of directly providing loss-prevention services to
policyholders is directly related to the potential effectiveness of these efforts. It is
relatively inexpensive for insurers to periodically provide policyholders with general
information about how they can reduce their risk of incurring losses. For this reason,
insurers and agents regularly engage in these efforts: homeowner insurers send
emails about keeping a fire extinguisher handy,204 cyber insurers periodically remind
policyholder personnel not to click on suspicious email links, 205 and workers’
compensation insurers provide employees with access to online safety information
and presentations.206
Although these mass communications to policyholders may marginally limit risk,
their primary purpose and effect are often directed just as much to marketing. Such
communications can help policyholders feel that their insurer is “on their side” while
reminding them of the ongoing protection their coverage supplies. Policyholders can
easily neglect this security if they do not experience a covered loss for an extended
period of time, which can decrease their willingness to pay for that protection. 207 But
we were unable to identify any evidence that these generalized insurer
communications meaningfully limit the risk of policyholder loss.208 We tend to doubt
that such an effect is common because policyholders have limited incentives to
carefully review this information and act upon it, especially in settings where the risk
of loss is principally financial (and hence compensable by insurance) rather than nonpecuniary.
Unlike generalized communications from insurers about risk management, there
is reasonably good evidence that customized advice, coaching, or consulting services
from insurers can meaningfully influence policyholder behavior. 209 But this is hardly
a certainty; in practice, insurers’ efforts to provide loss-prevention services often fail
to translate into reduced losses or premiums.210

204. See, e.g., Travelers Risk Control, Types of Fire Extinguishers, TRAVELERS,
https://www.travelers.com/resources/home/fire-safety/types-of-fire-extinguishers
[perma.cc/SBE8-KUNE].
205. See, e.g., Richard Seiersen, How to Manage Cybersecurity Risk: Series Introduction,
RESILIENCE INS. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.resilienceinsurance.com/how-to-managecybersecurity-risk-series-introduction [perma.cc/P7KN-TWFU]; see also MacColl, Nurse &
Sullivan, supra note 96, at 15.
206. Best
Loss
Control
Programs,
INS.
BUS.,
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/best-insurance/a/244399/
[perma.cc/4EUUGT9A] (noting that it is common for workers’ compensation insurers to provide policyholders
with online resources for improving safety).
207. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER WITH RALPH GINSBERG, LOUIS MILLER, PHILIP SAGI, PAUL
SLOVIC, BRADLEY BORKAN & NORMAN KATZ, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC
POLICY LESSONS 236–43 (1978).
208. See, e.g., MacColl, Nurse & Sullivan, supra note 96, at 15 (noting that while cyber
insurers communicate information to policyholders about emerging cyber risks, “both the
extent to which organisations act on that advice and the extent to which they are contractually
obligated to do so are unknown”).
209. See supra Part I.B.
210. See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 1811.
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Whether or not loss-prevention services actually reduce losses, they are costly for
insurers to provide. Because they are not necessary to effectuate the transfer of risk,
insurers supplying these loss-prevention services must hire additional personnel and
generate new systems for developing, implementing, and managing these efforts or
else pay third parties to supply these services on their behalf. 211 Even assessing the
impact of such loss prevention programs requires expertise that is outside the
conventional domain of actuaries, such as fluency with statistical techniques that can
control for differences in policyholders who receive these interventions and those
who do not.212
While robust loss prevention services are costly for insurers to supply, they do
not directly generate any revenue or neccesarilly increase customer demand. Lossprevention services are generally provided by insurers to policyholders free of
charge, an approach that is typically deemed necessary to induce policyholders to
take advantage of them.213 Yet most policyholders, and even more importantly the
brokers who advise them on purchasing coverage, do not focus on the scope of such
loss-prevention services when selecting coverage.214 The net result is that some
commercial insurers simply opt not to provide robust direct loss prevention services
so that they can offer cheaper coverage upfront. 215 For this reason, states have
occasionally found it necessary to mandate that insurers in certain lines of business
provide loss-prevention services to insureds.216

211. A variety of firms provide loss-prevention services that insurers can purchase for their
policyholders.
See,
e.g.,
Loss
Control
Services,
SAFETYRESOURCES,
https://www.safetyresources.com/loss-control-services [https://perma.cc/53RM-DNTR].
212. See MacColl, Nurse & Sullivan, supra note 96, at 28 (“[D]ue to the lack of reliable
cyber risk data, underwriters are still developing a robust evidence base for whether a
particular security control leads to a measurable reduction in cyber risk.”).
213. See, e.g., Erin E. Meyers & Joni Hersch, Employment Practices Liability Insurance
and Ex Post Moral Hazard, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 965 (2021).
214. Best
Loss
Control
Service
Programs,
INS.
BUS.,
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/best-insurance/a/244399/
[perma.cc/FE9LKHPF] (“[M]itigation offerings were not highly rated at all by brokers—coming second last
out of six factors they rated.”).
215. See Meyers & Hersch, supra note 213, at 965 (noting significant variation among
employer practices liability insurers in their provision of loss-prevention measures, such as
800 numbers for employee complaints, hotlines for insured businesses to call with legal
questions, assistance crafting employment policies, and training on employment best
practices).
216. See Bob Wagner, Insurers Facing Needs to Adjust: Loss Control Services in the New
Era,
LAB.
MGMT.
DECISIONS
(1994),
https://are.berkeley.edu/~howardrr/pubs/lmd/html/spring_94/losscontr.html
[perma.cc/CXM8-C5DC] (discussing a state mandate that workers’ compensation insurers
provide loss prevention services); Stephen D. Sugarman, California’s Insurance Regulation
Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 683, 694 (1990)
(noting that insurers are required by California law to offer a “good driver discount” of at least
twenty percent to drivers who meet the statute’s definition of a good driver); Press Release,
Cal. Dep’t Ins., Commissioner Lara Announces New Regulations to Improve Wildfire Safety
and Drive Down Cost of Insurance (Feb. 25. 2022), https://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400news/0100-press-releases/2022/release019-2022.cfm [perma.cc/6J9C-2MQ5] (describing
proposed regulations by California’s Insurance Commissioner that would require “insurance
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Of course, as Part I suggested, some insurers buck these trends, promising cheaper
coverage upfront in exchange for policyholders accepting continuous lossprevention services. But to be successful, this approach requires not only that the
insurer’s loss-prevention services decrease aggregate expected risk but also that the
insurer can capture a sufficient amount of the resulting benefits to offset the costs of
its risk-management services. It is to this issue that we now turn.
2. The Value of Individualized Services Can be Appropriated by Policyholders and
Competitors
Given the cost of providing individualized advice, training, and services to
policyholders, insurers will tend to have limited incentives to invest in these efforts
when they can only partially capture any resulting benefits. But in many settings, any
risk-mitigation benefits that insurer-supplied services create can be appropriated by
competitors or policyholders.217
This is because virtually all property/casualty insurance policies provide coverage
only for one year. A policyholder who experiences reduced losses due to direct
insurer services can thus demand correspondingly reduced premiums in future years.
If their insurer refuses to accede to these demands, then the policyholder can
purchase coverage from a competitor that reflects their improved risk profile, at least
if that competitor can observe reductions in risk that are attributable to an earlier
insurer’s provision of loss-prevention services. Policyholders that benefit from an
insurer’s loss-prevention advice can thus “sell” that benefit to competing insurers by
purchasing cheaper coverage from those competitors in future years.
To be sure, not all insurers that reduce policyholder risk through direct
interventions will see the fruits of their labor captured by their competitors or
policyholders. This possibility depends on several factors. First, insurers operating
in relatively non-competitive markets will, of course, face less risk of this result. This
helps to explain why extensive direct risk mitigation is more common in niche
insurance markets and among genuine mutual insurers,218 which tend to be more
active in less competitive markets.219
Second, insurers are more likely to profit from direct risk mitigation efforts that
principally reduce short-term, rather than long-term, risk; these benefits are harder
for competitors to appropriate because their effect will diminish once the underlying
loss services are no longer supplied. Thus, the risk-mitigating effect of an insureroperated safety hotline that supplies short-term and immediate risk-mitigating
benefits may be relatively hard for competitors to appropriate. By contrast, insurer
guidance on a policyholder’s internal policies may be relatively easy for competing

companies . . . to factor consumers’ and businesses’ wildfire safety actions into their pricing
of residential and commercial coverage”).
217. This obstacle is similar to the prospect that insurers will see their feature-rating
mimicked by competitors. See supra Part II.A.
218. See supra Part I.B.3.
219. See supra Part I.B.3. Genuine mutuals often arose from the collective efforts of
entities in need of coverage who could not find reliable options in the private market due to
periodic insurance availability crises. See supra Part I.B.3.
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insurers to appropriate because such policies impact long-term risk extending well
beyond the insurer’s annual policy period.
Third, insurers will better be able to capture the benefits of their risk-mitigation
services if competing insurers cannot easily observe the impacts of these efforts. In
that event, insurers would be unable to offer reduced premiums to applicants that
have benefited from the risk-mitigation efforts of their competitors. This result is less
likely to be obtained in settings where claims are common even for low-risk
policyholders, as effective risk mitigation in such settings will be observable from
the policyholder’s loss experience trends. By contrast, in contexts where claims are
relatively uncommon, it may be harder for an insurer to verify the impact of a prior
insurer’s risk-mitigation efforts. In the end, insurers’ willingness to invest in costly
measures to directly reduce risk thus depends on complicated market dynamics.
3. Direct Engagement Exposes Insurers to Potential Tort Liability
The prospect of incurring tort liability for their efforts also discourages insurers
from directly attempting to limit policyholder risk. As Kyle Logue has explored at
length, under ordinary tort law principles, businesses and individuals that
“voluntarily undertake” to assist others may have an affirmative duty to exercise
reasonable care when doing so.220 Courts have routinely applied this principle to hold
insurers liable for injuries sustained at a policyholder’s place of business after the
insurer “negligently inspected” those premises.221 These suits most commonly
involve workers’ compensation insurers that are alleged to have negligently
overlooked dangerous working conditions during inspections or boiler and
machinery insurers that plaintiffs claim negligently failed to detect problems with
machinery that subsequently malfunctioned and injured the plaintiff. 222 But the
principle behind these decisions applies more broadly.
The underlying doctrine in these cases incentivizes insurers only to use
information about policyholder risks for conventional risk-mitigation purposes, such
as setting rates and limiting coverage. Going further, by providing individualized
risk-mitigation advice or services, risks triggering tort liability exposure. That is
because insurers are liable under this doctrine only if the policyholder or a third party
reasonably relies on them to reduce the underlying risk.223 Insurers can therefore
avoid liability by demonstrating that any inspection of an insured’s premises or
scrutiny of its operations was conducted solely to facilitate the decision about
whether to offer coverage and on what terms to do so. In that event, no policyholder

220. See generally Logue, supra note 6, at 1382. See also Daniel Woods & Andrew
Simpson, Policy Measures and Cyber Insurance: A Framework, 2 J. CYBER POL’Y 209, 218
(2017) (reporting that some cyber insurers resisted communicating best practices to
policyholders because of the risk that doing so would expose them to liability); John Dwight
Ingram, Liability of Insurers for Negligence in Inspection of Insured Premises, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 623, 635 (2002).
221. See Logue, supra note 6, at 1360–76 (surveying this caselaw).
222. See id.
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 42 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
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or third party could reasonably rely on those efforts.224 The extent to which this
characterization is factually accurate is the key issue on which most reported caselaw
turns.225
At least some insurers are aware of this caselaw and cite it to help explain why
they do not provide individualized risk-mitigation services to policyholders. Logue,
for instance, interviewed some personnel at large property-casualty insurers who
“stated that they are reluctant to get too involved in the safety-related decisions of
their insureds because of the concern that their involvement will expose them to
direct tort liability.”226 Rappaport reported similar concerns among police liability
insurers’ employees.227 And cyber insurer personnel have also reported in interviews
that liability risk discourages affirmative interventions in policyholder operations. 228
4. Backlash from Customers
Another significant obstacle to direct risk-mitigation efforts by insurers is that
these efforts can, and often do, antagonize policyholders who do not want insurers
to tell them what to do. 229 Insurers that nonetheless attempt to encourage or require
policyholders to accept risk-mitigation services and advice thus may antagonize
policyholders and lose their business.
The risk that insurers will antagonize their customers if they push them to accept
significant risk-mitigation services depends on several variables. The first, as noted
above, is the competitiveness of the underlying insurance market. Insurers operating
in markets with only a few competitors may have the leverage necessary to insist that
policyholders accept services or advice that helps to limit the risk of an insured loss.
By contrast, insurers operating in highly competitive markets may feel constrained
in their capacity to demand significant time and attention from policyholders and
their personnel.230 For similar reasons, the condition of an insurance market is also
significant: insurers have more leverage to insist on affirmative risk-mitigation
measures during “hard markets,” when insurance is relatively costly and unavailable,
as opposed to during “soft markets,” when insurance pricing loosens.231

224. See Logue, supra note 6, at 1370 (surveying published caselaw and noting that the
“insurer typically argues that the safety inspection was not made ‘for the benefit’ of the
employer-insured or for the benefit of the employees of the insured” but was instead engaged
in “solely to determine whether to offer the insurance and, if so, under what terms”).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1366.
227. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1610.
228. See Woods & Simpson, supra note 220, at 218.
229. Mendoza, supra note 8, at 426–34 (explaining the reluctance of public schools’
liability insurers to engage in robust loss-prevention efforts as arising from insurers’
“appreciation of and sensitivity towards their members’ operational and political concerns”);
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 86, at 127 (highlighting D&O insurers’ reluctance to interfere
with corporate governance matters of their policyholders); Talesh, Legal Intermediaries,
supra note 8, at 229.
230. See MacColl, Nurse, & Sullivan, supra note 96, at 26 (describing how competitive
conditions in cyber insurance markets have some carriers to resist imposing significant
burdens on policyholders).
231. See Baker & Shortland, supra note 6.
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A second key factor is more subjective but just as real: the level of trust between
insurers and policyholders. Policyholders often resist insurer loss-management
advice when trust levels are low. Ordinary directors and officers, for instance, have
limited trust of D&O insurer recommendations regarding corporate governance.232
Similarly, local school boards have limited trust of their liability insurers’
recommendations on civil rights issues. The result is that the loss-prevention advice
of these insurers tends to be unwelcome, even though they operate in niche insurance
markets.233 And many businesses have limited trust in their cyber insurer’s
cybersecurity advice.234 Trust between policyholders and genuine mutual insurers is
much more common—though certainly not universal—because policyholders play a
comparatively large role in advising, managing, and directing these insurers’
operations.235
Finally, an important factor influencing policyholder willingness to accept riskmitigation advice, counseling, and services from insurers is the extent to which
coverage protects against most of the losses a policyholder is likely to suffer. When
policyholders are largely insulated from loss due to insurance, they receive little
direct benefit from insurers’ risk-mitigation efforts, which may operate purely as a
cost or nuisance.236 This may help explain why directors and officers resist corporate
governance advice from their insurers: D&O insurance is very broad and is subject
to only a few exclusions, mainly pertaining to egregious wrongdoing.237 By contrast,
policies in other insurance lines do not or cannot significantly protect insureds from
non-pecuniary losses associated with the insured activity. In these settings,
policyholders are more likely to value their insurer’s advice about how to reduce
their risk of an insured loss, at least where doing so also reduces the risk of uninsured
loss. It is for this reason that employers are often relatively amenable to workplacesafety advice from their workers’ compensation insurers:238 workplace accidents
produce various uncovered costs for employers, including physical pain for
employees, diminished employee morale, and undermined future recruiting
efforts.239 These uninsured costs can be reduced by following insurers’ advice about
how to reduce insured costs.
B. Insurers’ Influence of Aggregate Risk Levels
In addition to attempting to directly influence policyholders’ risk levels, insurers
can also attempt to reduce aggregate risk levels through means that bypass
policyholders entirely. There are two distinct ways in which this can occur. First,
insurers can advocate for public policies that may decrease the aggregate risk of loss

232. Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 1811, 1831.
233. Mendoza, supra note 8, at 427–32.
234. MacColl, Nurse, & Sullivan, supra note 96, at 25.
235. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1563–64.
236. Cf. Baker, supra note 11, at 277–79 (noting that moral hazard is less likely to occur
where a loss creates non-financial harms that are not covered by insurance).
237. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 571–72, 591 (indicating that there is blanket
coverage of liability for “wrongful acts” and specifying exclusions from coverage).
238. See supra Part I.B.
239. See supra Part II.A.
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facing policyholders, or society generally. For instance, auto insurers played a role
in encouraging states to adopt mandatory seat belt laws240 and property insurers have
advocated for updated building codes that would require new construction to include
“safe rooms” to protect individuals from deadly tornados.241
Second, insurers may seek to reduce aggregate risk levels by developing socially
useful information or technologies for this purpose, a strategy that typically requires
sustained engagement with outside experts or professional organizations.242 For
example, medical malpractice insurers played an important role in developing
techniques to limit the risks associated with general anesthesia. 243 Similarly, auto
insurers played an important role in producing auto-safety standards and safety
evaluations of individual vehicles, which have helped to increase the safety of
modern vehicles.244
A key feature of these unconventional loss-prevention strategies is that they are
not intended to combat moral hazard at all, as they are not geared towards
policyholder behavior. For this reason, lobbying and technology development by
insurers can potentially allow insurance to have a net-positive effect on loss
prevention.
But the capacity of insurers to meaningfully reduce risk in this way is more
constrained than many accounts suggest. First, as with certain types of featurerating,245 insurers’ efforts to reduce aggregate risk are a public good; such efforts
often therefore require collective insurer action. Second, insurers’ long-term interest
does not always lie in reducing aggregate risk. On the contrary, insurers may benefit
when aggregate risk increases. Insurers consequently influence risk in both
directions, promoting the reduction of certain risks while increasing others.
1. Efforts to Reduce Aggregate Risk Are a Public Good
Insurer efforts to reduce aggregate risk are a paradigmatic example of a public
good.246 The benefits of these efforts are not limited to individual insurers or their

240. See generally David J. Houston & Lilliard E. Richardson Jr., Traffic Safety and the
Switch to a Primary Seat Belt Law: The California Experience, 34 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 743 (2002).
241. See Christopher Flavelle, How the Building Industry Blocked Better Tornado
Safeguards,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
22,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/22/climate/tornadoes-building-codes-safety.html
[perma.cc/TV5E-6ZUP].
242. For an account of some of the ways in which insurers historically attempted to do this,
see CALEY HORAN, INSURANCE ERA: RISK, GOVERNANCE, AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF
SECURITY IN POSTWAR AMERICA 59–69 (2021).
243. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 411 (1994) (citing
John H. Eichhorn, Prevention of Intraoperative Anesthesia Accidents and Related Severe
Injury Through Safety Monitoring, 70 ANESTHESIOLOGY 572, 575–77 (1989)).
244. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 222–23.
245. See supra Part II.A.
246. Public goods are defined by the fact that they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable,
meaning that the benefit they produce cannot be limited to the producer or to those who benefit
from it initially. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:

262

IN D IAN A LA W J O U RN AL

[Vol. 98:215

policyholders, nor do the receipt of these benefits by some limit their availability to
others. For these reasons, insurer efforts to reduce aggregate risk suffer from the
conventional public good problem: individual insurers ordinarily have limited
incentives to invest in these efforts because they cannot capture most of the benefits
of doing so.
As with any collective action problem, one potential solution to this dilemma is
for insurers to coordinate their efforts. But the impediments to such efforts are well
known: to be successful, private actors must agree on their collective goals and
enforce individual contributions to achieving those goals through verifiable
benchmarks.247 Otherwise, individual actors in the collective enterprise will have an
incentive to cheat by shirking their efforts to advance social reductions in aggregate
loss.248 Additionally, these collective efforts must, of course, pass legal and
regulatory scrutiny that is designed to prevent anticompetitive collective private
efforts.249
Insurers can sometimes overcome these hurdles to collectively promoting social
risk reduction. Perhaps the best example is the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety, which is wholly funded by insurers and has long played a prominent role in
promoting motor vehicle safety.250 Insurers also played a role in founding and
supporting other important safety-oriented organizations, such as Underwriters
Laboratories, which tests a variety of products for safety. 251 And maritime insurers
covering arctic shipping have similarly acted collectively to develop safety
standards.252
But such collective efforts by insurers to reduce aggregate risk are hardly the
norm, as they require a broad coalition of insurers to have similar views as to the
proper course of their collective action. If insurers face heterogeneous risks or risk
levels, they may have different interests and find collective action unattractive. To

Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 C AL. L. REV. 1051, 1139
(2000).
247. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 1–52 (1965).
248. See id.
249. See Amelia Miazad, Prosocial Antitrust, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2022)
(exploring how current antitrust laws are a barrier to prosocial coordination among
competitors to address issues like climate change, income inequality, and pandemic response).
250. That organization was founded in 1959 by three insurance industry groups
representing more than 500 auto insurers and continues to be wholly funded by insurers. See
Member Groups, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, https://www.iihs.org/about-us/membergroups [perma.cc/DE84-HSQK].
251. Underwriters Laboratories (UL) was initially founded with economic support of
several insurers. But UL’s growth has largely transcended these insurance-focused origins; it
is not funded principally through other sources of revenue, such as fees paid by manufacturers
who acquire one of UL’s safety certifications. See Underwriters Laboratories Names Dr.
Christopher J. Cramer as Chief Research Officer, UNDERWRITER L ABORATORIES (Mar. 8,
2021),
https://ul.org/news/underwriters-laboratories-names-dr-christopher-j-cramer-chiefresearch-officer [perma.cc/4LQX-82S4] (“We fund our work through grants, the licensing of
standards documents and the business activities of UL Inc., our wholly owned
subsidiary . . . . ”).
252. See Baker & Shortland, supra note 6, at 6.
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illustrate, insurers that do not sell property insurance on the Florida coast, for
example, may be unwilling to invest much to support hurricane-loss prevention
research.253 It is for precisely this reason that the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety has proven so successful: virtually all auto insurers benefit in a relatively
evenly distributed way from the production of better vehicle-safety information and
evidence-based safety reforms. Consider, however, how often insurers may have
fragmented views about the appropriate scope of aggregate loss prevention. Such
fragmentation can arise for political reasons, concerns that reforms may reduce
future demand for insurance, beliefs that individual insurers can avoid exposure to
the risks at issue through underwriting or rating, apprehensions about the legal or
regulatory implications of collective action, or worries that collective action may be
publicly perceived as serving the selfish interest of the insurance industry rather than
the public.
Together, these considerations help to explain the numerous contexts in which
insurers have not acted collectively to reduce aggregate risk. For instance, U.S.
property insurers have done relatively little to collectively push for policies to fight
climate change, principally operating as the subject of such regulatory efforts rather
than the driving force behind these initiatives. Insurers’ lack of leadership in this
domain can be explained by the politicization of the issue, insurers’ capacity to drop
coverage in areas that become excessively risky as a result of climate change, the
differential impact of climate change in different regions of the United States, some
insurers’ capacity to profit in the short term from anti-climate policies, and insurers’
fear that any such efforts could trigger public backlash. 254 Similarly, cyber insurers
have done little to promote public policies to address cybersecurity. 255 Explanations
for this failure to tackle the accelerating risks of cybersecurity may be attributable to
some cyber insurers’ belief that they may not benefit from standardized security
standards because they can limit risk through underwriting, variation among cyber
insurers regarding the extent to which they believe their collective action would be
effective in meaningfully limiting cyber risk, and the relatively immature and
unsettled state of the cyber-insurance industry.
2. Reduction of Aggregate Risk May Decrease Demand for Insurance
Even when the collective action problems described above can be overcome, it is
not at all clear that insurers would always wish to do so in a way that decreased
aggregate risk. On the contrary, insurers may sometimes have a collective incentive
to increase aggregate social risk because doing so could increase demand for their
product.256 By contrast, the more that aggregate losses decrease, the less insurance

253. We are grateful to Peter Siegelman for this point.
254. See Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and The Transformation of Risk: Insurance
Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2008) (exploring limitations to insurers playing a quasiregulatory role with respect to climate change).
255. See supra Part I.
256. See Harris Schlesinger & Emilio C. Venezian, Ex Ante Loss Control by Insurers:
Public Interest for Higher Profit, 4 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 83, 83 (1990); Gary T. Schwartz, The
Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 312, 357 (1990)
(noting that insurers might not have incentives to offer loss-prevention services because doing
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anyone needs to purchase, and the less they will be willing to pay for this protection.
For these reasons, some commentators, including most recently Avraham and Porat,
have argued that insurers typically promote aggregate increases in losses, while then
competing individually to either prevent their own insureds from suffering losses or
to shift those losses onto uncovered third parties.257
We agree that insurers sometimes have a collective interest in seeing insurable
risk increase rather than decrease. Even when insurers’ incentives on this matter
diverge, a subset of insurers with this perspective may scuttle any collective effort to
decrease aggregate risk, as we suggested above.258 In addition, certain insurers—
those covering loss caused by ransomware attacks, for example—may have a
particular interest in preserving risks arising from third-party moral hazard 259
because they can do so without sending mixed messages to their policyholders about
taking appropriate precautions. Thus, for example, cyber insurers have actively
resisted proposals to ban or limit ransomware payments, which would surely help to
decrease the financial appeal to hackers of launching such attacks. 260 This resistance
to prohibitions on ransomware payments is, of course, perfectly consistent with
insurer efforts to encourage their own policyholders to limit their vulnerability to a
ransomware attack.
At the same time, Avraham and Porat’s analysis misses several key points that
can lead insurers to have a collective interest in taming risk. First, and most
importantly, their analysis does not sufficiently recognize insurers’ interests in
encouraging predictable changes in aggregate future losses. Insurers have extensive
experience pricing coverage appropriately in response to gradual changes in loss
rates.261 But changing risk landscapes that cause insured losses to fluctuate
unpredictably across short periods of time raise fundamental supply-side problems
for all insurers, and particularly reinsurers.262 In some cases, the best way for insurers
to increase the predictability of risk over time is to encourage targeted reductions in
risk. Appreciating this point helps to explain insurers’ support for tort reforms—
ceilings on pain and suffering damages, for example—that reduce insured loss and
enhance the predictability of liability. By contrast, Avraham and Porat’s explanation
for insurers’ role in tort reform—which distinguishes between insurers’ short-term

so could force them to charge lower premiums in the future).
257. See generally Avraham & Porat, supra note 7.
258. See supra Part III.B.1.
259. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 65.
260. See, e.g., Logue & Shniderman, supra note 6, at 256; Andrew G. Simpson. P/C
Insurers Defend Ransomware Reimbursements in New Cyber Principles, INS. J. (July 2, 2021),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/07/02/621178.htm [perma.cc/2XB2UG7H].
261. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (2006) (describing the appeal to insurers of
retaining ambiguous policy language that the courts have ruled provides coverage and simply
repricing coverage accordingly).
262. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 773–74 (1993) (recounting
efforts of reinsurers to secure revision of standard-form CGL insurance policy); ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 179 (presenting hypothesis that these efforts were designed to
avoid covering unpredictable, long-tail liabilities).
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and long-term interests in the enactment of damage ceilings—is far too complex to
explain insurers’ actual motivations, which seem to us much more simply
attributable to a preference for the predictability that ceilings enhance.263 This
preference for predictability also helps to explain why some insurers, and particularly
reinsurers in the EU, have played a meaningful role in addressing climate change; 264
climate change dramatically limits the predictive power of catastrophe models built
on historical data.265
Second, Avraham and Porat’s analysis also neglects the importance of whether
there is a legal or practical mandate for the purchase of insurance. Insurers operating
in effectively mandatory lines of coverage, such as auto liability, homeowners, and
workers’ compensation, have strong reasons to see aggregate risk decrease, at least
in the short- and medium-term. That is because demand for their insurance products
is already artificially assured, at least until the underlying laws or market
expectations adjust. Additionally, while premiums in these lines of coverage are
often regulated, it is much easier for insurers to avoid regulatory demands that they
decrease their rates than to convince regulators that they need to raise their rates
because of increased losses.266
Yet a third important factor is the character of the underlying insurance market.
Insurers operating in less competitive insurance markets may have a stronger
incentive to see aggregate risk decrease because they will be able to capture some of
the resulting benefits before premiums adjust downward. This is particularly true in
insurance markets subject to significant rate regulation, which can—perhaps
counterintuitively—inhibit reductions in premiums even when losses decrease.267
Also relevant is whether the market is significantly populated by genuine mutual
insurers, which have a strong interest in reducing aggregate losses even if they can
only partially capture the resulting financial benefits.268
Finally, insurers may have an interest in seeing aggregate risk levels decrease or
remain stable to promote the long-term loyalty of their policyholders. This may
occur, for instance, because stable insurance premiums decrease policyholders’
incentive to shop for new coverage.269 Alternatively, insurers may earn loyalty from
policyholders by touting their efforts to reduce aggregate social loss, particularly
when those efforts have a moral valence that appeals to a significant subset of
policyholders.

263. See Avraham & Porat, supra note 7, at 23–25.
264. See Net-Zero Insurance Alliance, UNITED NATIONS https://www.unepfi.org/net-zeroinsurance/ [perma.cc/KYC3-EP8L] (alliance of twenty of the world’s leading insurers and
reinsurers, most of which are based in Europe, to accelerate transition to net-zero emissions).
265. See Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change,
Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1795, 1812–13 (2007).
266. Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Rate Regulation of Auto Insurance, in
DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE 285, 309–10 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002).
267. See Harrington, supra note 266, at 309.
268. See supra Part I.B.3.
269. Varner & Sankin, supra note 147.
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IV. LESSONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The preceding Parts examined the limited capacity of conventional and
unconventional insurer practices to reduce moral hazard and prevent losses more
generally. This Part pulls together the main insights of this analysis. Section A begins
by disentangling several key concepts that are often conflated or confused in the
literature: avoiding the creation of moral hazard, combating moral hazard, preventing
loss, and regulation by insurance. Rigorously defining these terms is essential to
understanding the relationships between insurance and the risk of loss. Section B
moves from terminology to broader principles. It first highlights the distinction
between a net-negative and net-positive impact of insurance on loss prevention. It
then identifies three general principles governing the relationship among insurance,
moral hazard, and loss prevention.
A. The Relation Among Moral Hazard, Loss Prevention, and Regulation
Insurers can engage in various strategies to combat or avoid moral hazard, prevent
loss, and “regulate” policyholder conduct. Although the literature sometimes
conflates these concepts, they are distinct, albeit often overlapping, in ways that can
have important implications. Keeping the concepts straight is therefore a crucial
prerequisite to careful analysis.
1. Combatting Versus Avoiding the Creation of Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is traditionally defined as the tendency of an insured party to
exercise less care to avoid incurring an insured loss than the party would have
exercised if the loss were not insured.270 The literature, however, often conflates
insurer efforts to combat moral hazard with measures designed to avoid creating it
in the first instance. The former seeks to neutralize moral hazard, in whole or in part,
in ways that go beyond simply shifting risk back onto insureds. By contrast, the latter
simply consists of not insuring certain risks in order to avoid creating moral hazard
to begin with.
Insurer strategies vary regarding the extent to which they attempt to combat moral
hazard or to avoid creating it. Risk-based pricing is principally designed to combat
moral hazard, not to avoid creating it, as evidenced by the fact that it does not limit
the protection against risk afforded by coverage. Partial insurance, on the other hand,
primarily impacts risk by avoiding the creation of moral hazard through partial
noninsurance. But we earlier noted that the insured’s resulting incentive to avoid an
uninsured loss may lead it to take measures that simultaneously reduce the risk of
insured losses.271 Partial insurance may consequently have the potential to combat
moral hazard as well as to avoid creating it.
Like partial insurance, coverage conditions and exclusions are principally geared
toward avoiding the creation of moral hazard, though they may in some cases also
combat moral hazard. Strictly speaking, policy exclusions are noninsurance; they

270. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 8.
271. See supra Part II.B.
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limit insurance and any resulting moral hazard. For example, property insurance
exclusions for damage to vacant property avoid creating moral hazard by not
covering this type of loss. Coverage restrictions may, however, also combat moral
hazard by inducing policyholder precautions that extend beyond the risk at issue. For
instance, an exclusion for vacant buildings may affirmatively cause the insured to
rent out a portion of their building as a residence, which might counteract a broad set
of insured risks not unique to vacancy.272
Similarly, some forms of ex post loss management have the potential to combat
moral hazard, while others merely avoid creating moral hazard. Providing
policyholders with advice about how to mitigate loss once it has occurred or begun
to occur, for example, can combat moral hazard; rather than limiting the scope of
insurance, it helps to counteract the potential price insensitivity for repair that
insurance can generate.273 On the other hand, liability insurance provisions granting
insurers the right to defend and settle suits falling within the terms of coverage do
not combat moral hazard. 274 They avoid creating it in the first instance by taking
control of defense and settlement away from insureds, since such control would
create moral hazard.
Finally, unconventional forms of insurer loss prevention usually do not seek to
avoid creating moral hazard, as they do not restrict protection against risk. Instead,
they either combat the moral hazard that insurance has created or operate in ways
that are largely unrelated to moral hazard. Providing policyholders general lossprevention advice or individualized coaching, for example, combats (or has the
potential to combat) moral hazard.
2. Loss Prevention
All efforts to combat or avoid moral hazard are directed at loss prevention. But
only some efforts at loss prevention attempt either to combat or avoid the creation of
moral hazard. Many other loss-prevention efforts are largely unrelated to moral
hazard. For example, neither lobbying for risk-reducing public policies nor
supporting research that reduces the prospect of loss have anything to do with either
combatting moral hazard or avoiding it. It is for precisely this reason that these efforts
can plausibly have a net-positive effect on loss prevention by reducing risk below
levels that would exist in the absence of insurance.
Although insurers’ efforts to combat or avoid moral hazard are loss prevention in
a general sense, the accuracy of this label depends on the baseline employed. Insurer
strategies that simply avoid or partially combat moral hazard reduce the incidence of
loss compared to a baseline in which insurance is supplied without these devices
being employed. But calling this “loss prevention” is a peculiar use of that term;
insurance in that situation merely attempts to decrease its net-negative effect on loss
prevention, a result that seems more aptly labeled damage control.275

272. See Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 775, 776, 779 (3d Cir.
1983) (policyholder “[w]arranted that the 3rd floor is occupied as Janitor’s residence” in part
because of insurer’s assessment that building would be less at risk of damage in that event).
273. See supra Part II.D.
274. Id.
275. Some losses occur regardless of insurance because they are not worth avoiding even
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Insurers’ efforts to combat or avoid creating moral hazard can more properly be
termed loss prevention when they prevent losses relative to a scenario in which no
insurance protection exists. This can occur when, for instance, feature-rating or
coverage exclusions and conditions enable insureds to benefit from their insurers’
particular expertise in risk mitigation. For example, an insured who sees a sixty-day
vacancy exclusion in its policy might be more careful about vacancies than it would
have been if it were not insured at all. Similarly, liability insurers’ right to defend
suits may constitute loss prevention, as an uninsured defendant would sometimes
handle its own defense less effectively than the insurer.276
In short, assessing whether many of the devices that insurers use to combat or
avoid creating moral hazard constitute loss prevention requires asking the question,
“Compared to what?” In many cases, these devices moderate loss increases, rather
than prevent losses.
3. Regulation
If “regulation” simply means that one party influences another’s conduct, then
insurance, admittedly, involves considerable regulation.277 But so capacious a
definition of regulation yields little insight in our view, for it suggests that most
contracts, among other things, are regulation, in that they involve “governance” of a
counterparty’s behavior.278 Rather, a more meaningful definition of insurance as
regulation focuses on the extent to which insurers impose constraints on insureds,
like command-and-control directives and licensing, that are akin to paradigmatic
government regulation.
Most insurance mechanisms for combatting or avoiding moral hazard or reducing
loss more generally do not plausibly resemble such paradigmatic government
regulation. Neither providing advice, taking risk into account in pricing, nor refusing
to cover certain types of risks can helpfully be analogized to coercive rules that are
backed by the power of the state. In other cases, however, the “regulation”
characterization is a plausible fit. Perhaps most obviously, an insurer that refuses to
cover an excessively risky insured performs a function akin to licensing. This is
particularly true if coverage is legally mandated, in which case the state effectively

by an uninsured party. Ex post loss management may well reduce the amount of such losses
once they have begun to occur.
276. Uninsured defendants would, in the aggregate, likely settle suits against them for less
than the insurer, simply because, in the aggregate, they have fewer assets. But this would not
constitute loss prevention, and would only shift the loss to the plaintiff/victim.
277. Much of the early literature on the capacity of insurance to act as a form of governance
or private regulation does indeed seem to employ this rather capacious definition of insurance.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19, at 47–48; Ewald, supra note 19; HEIMER, supra note 19, at
20–21.
278. The insurance as “governance” literature of recent decades, for example, makes use
of the governance metaphor in useful ways without relying on regulation analogy. See, e.g.,
RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 43–65
(2003); TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 9 (2010).
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outsources the traditional licensing function to insurers.279 Similarly, coverage
conditions and exclusions that cause policyholders to incorporate certain practices
into their operations are akin to regulation.280 Like traditional regulatory rules, failure
to follow the terms and conditions of coverage may result in the “fine” of being
denied coverage for a loss, having coverage cancelled or nonrenewed, or facing
increased premiums.
Efforts to characterize other insurance tools as regulation due to their parallels to
“Pigouvian” taxes are unpersuasive. Pigouvian taxes aim to make private parties bear
the full costs of activities that create negative externalities, like pollution.281 Unlike
traditional command-and-control regulation, however, these taxes allow regulated
entities, rather than government bureaucrats, to decide how to adjust their operations
in response to these incentives. Experience rating has a similar flavor, as it too aims
to induce policyholders to select conduct modifications of their own choosing by
causing them to better internalize the costs of their risk-taking. But this is a curious
use of the term “regulation,” as Pigouvian taxes have long been understood as an
alternative to traditional command-and-control regulation and licensing. To turn
around now and call experience rating “regulation” because of its similarities to
Pigouvian taxes ignores the fact that these taxes have long been considered an
alternative to traditional regulation.
Ultimately, most insurer strategies designed to combat or avoid moral hazard or
to prevent loss more generally are quite distinct from regulation. Only when
government requires the purchase of insurance directly or indirectly, or when
insurers adopt coverage terms akin to paradigmatic command-and-control
regulation, does it make sense to label these techniques “regulation.”
B. General Principles
This Part first focuses on the distinction between the net-negative and net-positive
impact of insurance on loss. It explains why insurance will rarely have a net-positive
impact on loss prevention and why most proposals centered on using insurance to
achieve this goal are unlikely to succeed if adopted. This Part then identifies three
factors that influence the capacity of insurance to combat moral hazard, avoid
creating moral hazard, or reduce the risk of loss more generally.
1. Net-Negative Versus Net-Positive Impacts on Loss and Insurance Mandates
At least some of the regulation-thesis literature elides the important distinction
between mechanisms that reduce the net-negative impact of insurance on loss and
insurance mechanisms that generate a net-positive impact on loss. Insurance, in most
cases, cannot in fact decrease overall risk. Parts II and III canvassed at length the
reasons that both the conventional and unconventional methods of combatting moral

279. See TOM BAKER, KYLE D. LOGUE & CHAIM SAIMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 10
(5th ed. 2021) (indicating how insurers act as “gatekeepers” and “private regulators” when
insurance must be purchased).
280. See supra Part II.C.
281. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 171 (1988).
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hazard are limited in their effectiveness. If, as we have argued, insurance can rarely
fully reduce its net-negative impact on loss prevention to as great an extent as the
regulation-thesis literature suggests, then, a fortiori, insurance cannot often have a
net-positive impact on loss prevention: you have to walk before you can run, and on
the whole, insurance does not even walk quickly. The few exceptions documented
in the literature—involving certain (though not all) forms of genuine mutual
insurance, highly unusual niche markets populated by a small number of insurers,
and (to a certain extent) workers’ compensation and auto insurance telematics—
underscore the constraints that operate in most standard commercial insurance
markets.
Attempting to overcome these constraints by requiring insurers to promote
regulatory objectives risks foisting on them a role that—as the analysis in Parts II
and III revealed—is not likely to be profit-maximizing. This will raise the cost of
insurance for those policyholders who already have coverage and decrease insurers’
willingness to offer coverage more generally. Efforts to use policy levers to induce
insurers to reduce risk may therefore not be worth the candle even in the narrow set
of instances in which insurance could have a net-positive impact on loss prevention.
The normative implications of the distinction between the net-positive and netnegative impact are significant. Most notably, proposals to mandate or expand the
scope of insurance to achieve regulatory objectives often depend crucially on the net
impact of insurance on loss.282 If insurance will have a net-negative impact on loss,
then such proposals will rarely be sensible. The key exception is that insurance
mandates may be practically necessary to facilitate the ability of liability to deter
misconduct. This might be the case for three interrelated reasons.
First, new or expanded forms of liability might require mandating or encouraging
new forms of liability insurance in order to avoid exposing individuals or firms to
excessive risk. For instance, a proposal to impose liability on firms or individuals
that misuse AI might only be feasible as a practical matter if potentially liable actors
could purchase liability coverage. Otherwise, the threat of liability could excessively
deter the use of AI by threatening to financially ruin anyone who engages in that
activity.283
Second, mandating liability insurance might help facilitate the deterrent force of
liability by displacing other forms of risk protection that are even less likely to reduce
risk than insurance. The best example here involves recent proposals to require police
officers to purchase liability insurance against the risk of being held liable for
excessive force or other forms of official misconduct.284 Such a proposal has the
potential to reduce risk only because officers currently are almost entirely protected
from any form of personal liability as a result of indemnification practices of cities
and municipalities.285 Relative to blanket indemnification, liability insurance might

282. Proposals to mandate insurance raise a host of supply-side issues. See, e.g.,
ABRAHAM, supra note 17, at 51 (discussing the likely reluctance of police liability insurers to
offer universal coverage to individual police in the event of such a mandate).
283. See Lior, supra note 5, at 525–26.
284. See Martin Kaste, To Change Police Practices, A Push for Liability Insurance in
Minneapolis, NPR (June 27, 2016, 6:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/27/483420607/tostop-police-lawsuits-reformers-want-officers-to-get-insurance [perma.cc/N4TT-LGNU].
285. Currently, the limited risk that officers face of personal liability is almost entirely
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well do a good job at preventing police misconduct. Meanwhile, merely prohibiting
indemnification without allowing for any insurance backstop would raise the first
problem mentioned above by exposing officers to excessive liability risk, which
could undermine departments’ capacity to recruit and retain officers.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, mandating the purchase of liability
insurance could enhance the prevention of losses by individuals who would
otherwise be judgment proof.286 Standing alone, the threat of liability can do little to
influence the incentives of judgment-proof individuals. By contrast, the threat of an
increase in future liability insurance premiums, or even of a future denial of
insurance leading to loss of the right to engage in the previously insured activity,
could well impact a policyholder’s incentives.287 Thus, for example, judgment-proof
drivers who do not otherwise fear incurring tort liability might nonetheless fear
increased insurance costs or loss of the right to drive that accompanies a liability
insurance requirement and consequently drive more safely.
Notably, each of these three scenarios in which mandatory liability insurance
might reduce losses notwithstanding significant limitations in insurers’ capacity to
induce care are narrow. For instance, many of the entities and organizations that are
the subject of proposals for mandatory liability insurance are likely to have assets
that exceed the amount of liability insurance that any realistic proposal would require
them to purchase.288 Meanwhile, judgment-proof individuals will often have strong
incentives to avoid loss that are likely to dominate any marginal incentive effect of
personal liability. For instance, drivers are already influenced by two powerful forces
to avoid negligent driving: the threat of conviction for violating traffic laws and the
interest in self-preservation that accompanies unsafe driving. Moreover, drivers do
not face the prospect of losing their driving privileges when their insurers refuse to
sell them coverage. In every state, there are mechanisms in place to ensure that
liability insurance is available to drivers as long as they hold valid licenses.289
2. Three Determinative Factors
With these considerations in mind, three factors emerge from our analysis as
determinative of the impact of insurance on moral hazard and loss prevention: (a)
the costs and benefits to policyholders of loss prevention efforts; (b) the information

offset via indemnification by police departments of individual officers who are found civilly
liable for misconduct. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
885, 895 (2014).
286. S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 54 (1986); see
also Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1394 (1994).
287. Of course, potentially judgment-proof individuals are unlikely to purchase liability
insurance unless they are required to do so. It is for precisely this reason that auto liability
insurance is required in virtually every state, with limited exceptions. See ABRAHAM &
SCHWARCZ, supra note 3, at 713–14.
288. Companies required to purchase cyber insurance, for example, ordinarily would not
be judgment proof and therefore would not find their loss-prevention incentives enhanced by
requirements that they purchase liability insurance. See Lemnitzer, supra note 5, at 131.
289. These mechanisms are admittedly contingent—they could be eliminated—but, as a
practical matter, that is extraordinarily unlikely.
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about premiums, safety, and the scope of coverage that insurers communicate to
policyholders; and (c) the costs and benefits to insurers of mitigating insured risks.
a. The Costs and Benefits to Policyholders of Loss-Prevention Efforts
Whether or not a party is insured, they will engage in loss-prevention efforts only
to the extent that the resulting benefits predictably exceed their costs. The costs of
safety precautions or adjustments in activity levels typically remain the same when
a party is insured, but the benefits of these changes are reduced, since the insurer is
responsible for insured losses. That is the source of moral hazard.
The benefits of loss prevention, however, do not disappear once a party is insured.
Rather, loss-prevention efforts may still generate benefits of two sorts. First,
whenever insurance protection is limited, loss-prevention efforts may benefit
policyholders by reducing uninsured loss.290 Uninsured losses may be explicitly
carved out from coverage, as with deductibles, exclusions, or conditions. Or they
may arise from the fact that certain losses do not fall within the affirmative grant of
coverage, either because they are not monetary or are too attenuated from an
accident. Workers’ compensation insurance, for instance, does not cover the costs of
decreased employee morale from a workplace accident. Second, loss-prevention
efforts may help to keep future premiums lower than they would otherwise be if the
insurer engages in experience rating. But this benefit is muted for policyholders that
face limited downsides from reducing or eliminating their coverage in future years.
Policyholders will also discount the cost of premium increases that occur well into
the future and are contingent on extraneous factors, like broader insurance market
dynamics.291
The potential costs to policyholders of loss-prevention efforts, meanwhile, are not
simply monetary. As we saw earlier, some corporate managers prefer to purchase
D&O insurance that is accompanied by limited insurer efforts to interfere with
corporate governance matters.292 Similarly, school boards often prefer liability
coverage that involves little insurer involvement in policy matters.293 Potential
interference with governance and management resulting from insurer encouragement
of loss prevention, while difficult to monetize, is a cost to such policyholders that
apparently sometimes outweighs the potential benefits of these efforts. Insurer lossprevention efforts may also impose significant privacy-related harms on
policyholders, a fact that helps to explain the limited prevalence of telematics.294
b. Imperfect Information
Even assuming that some degree of loss prevention could produce net
policyholder benefits, loss prevention may not occur because either the insurer or the
policyholder does not have the information necessary to conclude that this is the case.

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.4.
See supra Part II.A.1.
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Insurers seeking to induce policyholder loss-prevention efforts must have
appropriate risk-based information to do so. Insurers collect reams of information to
measure risk, but they cannot always use this information to encourage policyholder
loss prevention. Measuring risk is the traditional domain of insurance actuaries and
requires only identifying correlations between information and expected loss. By
contrast, encouraging loss prevention requires insurers to identify and measure
causal connections between precautions and activities on the one hand and expected
loss on the other hand, and that is a much harder task than traditional actuarial risk
assessment.295 Insurers that identify and quantify such causal linkages have an
incentive to keep this information secret from policyholders and competitors alike,
which minimizes the extent to which it can be employed to limit risk. 296 It is for
precisely these reasons that insurers engage in much less feature rating or
unconventional loss-prevention efforts than is often suggested.
Policyholders, like insurers, may also have insufficient information to adopt lossprevention strategies that would benefit them. Experience rating, partial insurance,
and coverage restrictions—three of the principal conventional devices to encourage
loss prevention—rely on policyholders to respond to the incentives that these devices
create. For this to happen, however, policyholders must possess two distinct forms
of information. First, they must be aware of their insurance product’s structure when
they make relevant risk-based decisions. Second, they must be able to identify the
precautions or changes in activities that will mitigate the risk of loss and (in the case
of experience rating) the impact that adopting these measures will have on future
premiums. These informational requirements will often not be met; insurers do not
routinely clearly communicate the terms of coverage, the impact of loss on future
premiums, or the future premium reductions that policyholders can anticipate from
avoiding losses.297 Although certain precautions can be embedded within the terms
of the insurance product in the case of exclusions or conditions that target risky
behaviors, this is not the case for simple loss-sharing provisions or experience rating.
Unconventional forms of loss prevention that are directed at policyholders only
partially avoid these informational problems. Obviously, insurer efforts to advise
policyholders on appropriate precautions or policies or to train policyholder
employees require insurers to communicate information to insureds. But insurers
typically do not quantify how much these measures will reduce expected losses or
future premiums.
It is only a slight exaggeration, therefore, to suggest that many putative lossprevention devices leave insureds in the dark about how to reduce their risk of loss
or what benefits will result from adopting specific precautions or adjusting activity
levels. Instead, insurers often provide only general signals that loss-prevention
efforts may be worthwhile. This is hardly the brave new world that many proponents
of the regulatory thesis envision.

295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See supra Part II.
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c. The Costs and Benefits to Insurers of Loss Prevention
Insurers will not promote loss prevention by their policyholders unless the
benefits to the insurer of doing so exceed their costs. The benefits to insurers of loss
prevention are straightforward. Having provided insurance coverage, their shortterm profits will increase to the extent that policyholder losses decrease.
As with policyholders, however, even in the short term, there is a limit to the
benefits insurers can obtain from investing in loss prevention. Identifying effective
precautions and quantifying their causal impact can be costly for insurers, as these
efforts require expertise distinct from actuarial risk measurement. Communicating
this information to policyholders may also be costly. Yet such efforts will not reliably
produce benefits for insurers; the cost of communicating loss-prevention
recommendations that fall on deaf ears is a pure loss to the insurer.
Moreover, the prospect of increasing short-term profits is in potential tension with
two countervailing long-term considerations. First, loss-prevention insights that an
insurer communicates to its applicants and insureds are likely to become available to
competing insurers in short order. And even if competitors cannot identify these
insights directly, they may be able to appropriate them indirectly simply by offering
lower premiums to firms that have benefits from this advice. Second, insurer
investments in loss prevention can have the long-term effect of decreasing demand
for insurance. To be sure, this effect may be muted when coverage is legally
mandated, and it may produce benefits by making losses more easily predictable for
insurers. But steady increases in risk are often in insurers’ collective interest; the
$200 billion per year auto insurance industry would be a much smaller enterprise,
for example, if auto injuries had not increased more than a thousand-fold during the
twentieth century.298
CONCLUSION
Insurance creates moral hazard. The fundamental purpose of insurance, after all,
is to encourage productive and socially desirable risk-taking, and risk-taking
necessarily sometimes leads to loss. Even when insurer efforts to mitigate moral
hazard are successful, these efforts typically constitute damage control, not the
regulation by insurance that many proponents of the regulation thesis describe. And
frequently, even these efforts are only partly successful. Neither the conventional nor
the unconventional methods that insurers employ to reduce risk can, in most
circumstances, produce a net-positive effect on loss. For these reasons, policy
proposals to deploy insurance to achieve broader regulatory aims will often prove to
be unsuccessful.

298. See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Rethinking the Development of Modern
Tort Liability, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1307–10 (2021) (chronicling increases in auto liability
insurance premiums during the twentieth century).

